Rountree v. Balicki
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9757
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Rountree (a/k/a Hawkins) committed two July 1993 NJ crimes: Essex County shooting causing paraplegia, and Camden County armed robbery using a towel to approach a woman; Miranda waiver given, later claimed pistol was real.
- Both crimes were Graves Act offenses; Rountree had prior Graves Act conviction in Essex County by the time of Camden sentencing.
- Plea negotiations occurred separately in each county; Rule 3:25A-1 allowed consolidation for plea/sentencing but Camden counsel did not file a consolidation motion.
- Essex County charges were resolved by plea and a Graves Act sentence; Camden County trial followed after transfer, resulting in a 50-year Graves Act sentence with parole ineligibility, consecutive to Essex County sentence.
- State post-conviction relief found Camden counsel’s failure to consolidate fell below objective standards but not prejudicial, and NJ Supreme Court denied review; district court denied habeas relief under AEDPA.
- On appeal to the Third Circuit, AEDPA standards govern review of the state court’s Strickland decision, focusing on 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) with deference to factual findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the state court’s Strickland prejudice ruling unreasonable under AEDPA? | Rountree asserts consolidation would have yielded a better offer; prejudice shown. | State court found consolidation would not have changed outcome; Rountree would have rejected any consolidated offer. | Not unreasonable; no clear and convincing evidence of prejudice under AEDPA. |
| Did the state court apply Strickland’s prejudice standard reasonably? | Counsel’s failure to consolidate caused longer Graves Act sentence. | Record shows April 1996 offer was as good as consolidation would have produced; rejection cannot be attributed to counsel’s deficiency. | Yes, reasonable application; no Strickland prejudice. |
| Was the state court’s application of Strickland under §2254(d)(1) not contrary to federal law? | Counsel’s inaction violated Strickland. | State court correctly applied Strickland and reasonable probability standard. | Not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. |
| Were the state court’s determinations of facts under §2254(d)(2) unreasonable? | Transcript supports that consolidation would have changed strategy. | Transcript read in context supports the state court findings; no clear and convincing rebuttal. | Not unreasonable under §2254(d)(2); findings accepted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rompilla v. Be ard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (unreasonable application when state court misapplies established law)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411 (2009) (reasonable probability standard is demanding under AEDPA)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (three-part AEDPA framework for §2254(d) review)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ( outlines ‘unreasonable application’ standard)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (clarifies limits of de novo review in federal habeas)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (limits evidence review to record before state court)
- State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558 (1989) (consolidation rights under Rule 3:25A-1)
- Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74 (2005) (state-law determinations bind federal habeas)
- Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223 (2009) (AEDPA evidentiary standard for §2254(e)(1))
- Alvarado v. Dretke, 131 S. Ct. 1396 (2011) (fairminded jurists could disagree; deference to state court findings)