Rossell v. the State
341 Ga. App. 356
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Taboris Rossell was indicted on multiple charges arising from four incidents over a five-week period in Spalding Heights: two aggravated batteries (one at a detention center), armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; some charges merged for sentencing and one incident resulted in acquittal.
- Victims suffered similar types of blunt-force facial injuries in several incidents; one incident (detention-center altercation) was captured on video and another involved an identified gun and $20 on Rossell.
- Rossell filed a speedy-trial demand under OCGA § 17-7-170 and a motions packet that included a short motion to sever; just before trial counsel orally supplemented the motion with a particularized motion to sever.
- The trial court denied the motion for severance and also denied Rossell’s motion for discharge and acquittal under the speedy-trial statute, citing scheduling constraints and alleged inaccuracies in counsel’s filings.
- Rossell appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by denying severance; the Court of Appeals reviewed whether joinder was proper and whether the jury could segregate the evidence for each offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by denying motion to sever offenses joined in one indictment | Rossell: offenses should have been severed because they were joined solely on similarity and joinder prejudiced him | State: offenses were related in time, place, witnesses, and modus operandi; joinder appropriate and severance discretionary | Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion denying severance; jury could distinguish charges |
| Whether the similarity of offenses required mandatory severance | Rossell: similar-character joinder required severance | State: offenses showed common scheme/plan or identical modus operandi except one incident, making severance discretionary | Held discretionary; facts supported joinder and trial court’s exercise of discretion |
| Whether the number/complexity of counts would prevent jury from applying law to each count | Rossell: multiple similar counts would confuse jurors and prejudice him | State: limited number, overlapping witnesses, short timeframe, and clear evidence allowed jurors to differentiate | Court: evidence and acquittal on some counts showed jury could distinguish and apply law correctly |
| Preservation of alternative speedy-trial service argument | Rossell: later on appeal argued speedy-trial demand was not properly served (alternative) | State: argument not raised below so not preserved | Court: claim not preserved for appellate review |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- Hall v. State, 335 Ga. App. 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (standard for viewing evidence on appeal)
- Evans v. State, 266 Ga. App. 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (joinder/severance principles and factors for discretionary severance)
- Harmon v. State, 281 Ga. App. 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (abuse-of-discretion review of severance denial)
- Fielding v. State, 299 Ga. App. 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (severance/joinder context)
- Langston v. State, 195 Ga. App. 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (similar-modus-operandi joinder analysis)