Ross v. Early
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18905
D. Maryland2011Background
- Ross challenged a city policy restricting sidewalk demonstrators around First Mariner Arena during circus performances; the policy (the Protocol) restricted where demonstrators could stand, allegedly limiting First Amendment rights.
- The Protocol emerged after 2003 traffic/pedestrian congestion problems caused by a PETA truck; 2004 protocol formalized sidewalk restrictions involving the east, north, and west sides of the Arena.
- Ross was arrested in 2008 and 2009 for leafleting outside the designated area; arrests were videotaped and involved Officer Early, who co-owned security company with Feld Entertainment.
- The City argued the Protocol targeted to curb congestion from circus protests and that it was a content-neutral time/place/manner restriction serving a significant government interest.
- The court initially denied summary judgment on facial/as-applied First Amendment challenges and held issues remained for the jury; reconsideration addressed qualified immunity and narrowed relief.
- The February 25, 2011 order granted qualified immunity to most defendants, except Officer Early, and entered judgment against Ross on Counts IV and X of the Second Amended Complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Protocol is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment | Ross contends the Protocol targets demonstrators and violates speech rights | City Defendants argue the Protocol is a valid time/place/manner restriction | Facial challenge survives only if protocol is targeted; jury must decide general applicability vs injunction-like tailoring |
| Whether the Protocol, even if facially neutral, was applied discriminatorily against Ross | Ross alleges enforcement targeted animal-welfare demonstrators | Barclay/Officers claim neutral application; any animus disputed | As-applied challenge survives; jury to determine discriminatory enforcement (animus possible) |
| Whether the Protocol is narrowly tailored under Ward v. Rock Against Racism or the heightened Madsen standard | Protocol not narrowly tailored to address past problems; overbroad | If generally applicable, Ward standard may apply; if injunction-like, Madsen applies | Fact issue on tailoring; protocol potentially broadly tailored or injunctive in nature depending on general applicability, for jury to decide |
| Whether Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the First Amendment claims | Ross argues officers violated clearly established rights | Officers acted reasonably under the protocol given beliefs of applicability | Officer Early not entitled to qualified immunity; remaining defendants granted immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1983) (content-neutral restriction must be narrowly tailored and provide alternatives)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (U.S. 1989) (no broader than necessary; balance of government interest and ample alternatives)
- Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (U.S. 1985) (forum analysis; public forum protections)
- Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1997) (leafletting and public speech in public forums protected)
- Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (U.S. 1981) (public forum restrictions may be permissible for safety/flow concerns)
- Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (U.S. 1965) (state interest in maintaining safe movement on public streets)
- Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (U.S. 1994) (heightened tailoring for injunctions; factors for narrowly tailored restrictions)
- City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1986) (secondary effects doctrine; content-neutral restrictions may be permissible)
- City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (U.S. 1993) (content-neutral restrictions; speech context matters)
- McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636 (3d Cir. 2009) (heightened scrutiny extended to non-injunction restrictions)
- Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2004) (heightened scrutiny applicable beyond injunctions)
