Ross v. DIST. ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, 672 F.3d 198

George Anthony Ross was convicted of third-degree murder after his third trial on the same charge in Pennsylvania.
Erwin testified at the second trial; at the third trial he refused to testify, was deemed unavailable, and his prior testimony was read to the jury.
The Commonwealth also read into evidence Erwin's crimen falsa convictions, but omitted his false-report conviction from the list at trial.
Ross sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting Confrontation Clause and related Sixth Amendment claims.
The district court and Third Circuit considered whether Erwin’s prior testimony could be used given Ross’s opportunity to cross-examine at the prior trial, and whether the in camera juror conference affected due process.
The court ultimately held Ross’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated and affirmed his conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Confrontation Clause applicability	Ross alleges Erwin's absence violated Confrontation Clause rights.	Erwin's unavailable testimony could be read under controlling precedent if prior cross-examination existed.	Not a Confrontation Clause error; existing cross-examination sufficed
Full and fair opportunity to cross-examine	Ross lacked a full cross-examination about Thornton's testimony at the second trial.	No statutory or court-imposed restriction curtailed cross-examination at the second trial.	Ross had a full and fair opportunity; no violation
Admission of Erwin's crimen falsi conviction	Omitting the crimen falsi conviction prejudiced Ross under Strickland.	Any prejudice from one additional conviction was not reasonably probable to change the outcome.	No ineffective-assistance prejudice; no reversal
In camera juror conference	Constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by discussing with a single juror outside the full panel.	Conference without the entire jury was permissible when appropriately limited and counseling was present.	No reversible error; conference did not impair fairness
Right to be present at proceedings	Ross had a right to be present at the in camera conference.	Presence was not necessary to ensure fairness and could be counterproductive.	No due process violation; presence not required

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2009) (confrontation rights and testimonial evidence)
Owens v. United States, 484 U.S. 554 (U.S. 1988) (full and fair cross-examination concept)
Fensterer v. Delaware, 474 U.S. 15 (U.S. 1985) (limits on cross-examination and confrontation scope)
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (U.S. 1987) (trial right to cross-examination scope)
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (full and fair opportunity to probe witness bias)
Gagnon v. United States, 470 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1985) (presence at jury conference and fairness considerations)
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1934) (due process considerations in trial presence)
Stincer v. United States, 482 U.S. 730 (U.S. 1987) (presence rights when critical stages affect defense)
Rabb v. United States, 450 F.2d 343 (3d Cir. 1971) (limits on juror conference error assessment)
Gullia v. United States, 450 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1971) (misconduct in juror conference requiring reversible error)