Ross Thill v. Reed Richardson, 996 F.3d 469

Ross Thill was tried for sexual contact with A.M.M., his ex‑girlfriend’s eight‑year‑old daughter; forensic testing found semen on the child’s underwear matching Thill.
Thill testified that his ex‑girlfriend, April Gray, framed him by saving his semen and coaching the child; Gray denied framing but admitted past untruthfulness to police.
After arrest Thill was Mirandized, gave some biographical statements, then invoked his right to remain silent and did not tell police his framing theory at the initial interview.
At trial the prosecutor cross‑examined Thill and argued in closing that Thill’s failure to raise the framing theory earlier undermined his credibility; Thill’s trial counsel did not object.
A jury convicted Thill of one count of sexual contact; he was sentenced to 16 years plus 9 years extended supervision.
Thill’s state postconviction claim alleged ineffective assistance for failure to object to a Doyle violation; the Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed impropriety but found no Strickland prejudice. The federal district court agreed the prosecutor violated Doyle but denied habeas relief on AEDPA/Strickland deference; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor’s use of Thill’s post‑Miranda silence (Doyle violation)	Thill: prosecutor impermissibly impeached him with silence; counsel was deficient for not objecting and prejudice follows.	State: comments were brief and isolated; evidence (victim testimony + DNA) was strong; defense weak; no reasonable probability of different outcome.	Held: No relief. Court assumed possible Doyle error but affirmed that under Strickland (and AEDPA) Thill failed to show prejudice.
Whether the state court’s Strickland analysis was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under AEDPA	Thill: appellate opinion was terse and applied an outcome‑determinative standard rather than Strickland’s reasonable‑probability test.	State: court correctly paraphrased Strickland, found the comments isolated and evidence strong; its conclusion was reasonable.	Held: The appellate court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland; AEDPA deference applies.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (post‑Miranda silence may not be used to impeach a defendant at trial)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and custodial‑interrogation protections)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test; prejudice = reasonable probability of different result)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (high deference to state court rulings on habeas review)
Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (framework for reviewing state‑court habeas decisions under AEDPA)
Taylor v. Bradley, 448 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2006) (counsel’s failure to object to Doyle violation may not be prejudicial where evidence is strong and defense weak)