Ross Barker v. Iowa Department of Public Safety
922 N.W.2d 581
| Iowa | 2019Background
- Ross Barker pled guilty in 2008 to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse (aggravated misdemeanor). The sentencing court told him he would have a ten‑year sex‑offender registration obligation and entered an order reflecting ten years.
- When released in 2013 the sheriff told Barker he was subject to lifetime registration; Barker sought postconviction relief claiming his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was misinformed about registration length.
- In 2015 the Iowa Court of Appeals decided on the merits that Barker had been told correctly and only owed ten years of registration; Barker sought further review but was denied.
- Barker then applied to the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS) to accept the court of appeals ruling; DPS concluded Barker was subject to mandatory lifetime registration and refused to follow the 2015 opinion.
- Barker sought judicial review. The district court and, on transfer, the court of appeals upheld the DPS, relying on State v. Bullock that the DPS determines registration length. The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review.
- The Supreme Court concluded issue preclusion applied to the 2015 court of appeals decision and remanded, vacating the court of appeals decision and reversing the district court judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Barker's Argument | DPS / State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2015 court of appeals determination that Barker was told he owed ten years of registration precludes the DPS from imposing lifetime registration | 2015 decision resolved whether Barker was misinformed; issue preclusion bars DPS from imposing lifetime registration | DPS argued Bullock reserves determination of registration length to the agency and the agency should be free to reach its own conclusion (and raised exceptions to preclusion) | Court held issue preclusion applies: the 2015 adjudication of whether Barker was misinformed is binding on DPS in these rare circumstances |
| Whether Bullock’s rule (courts lack authority to set registration length) defeats preclusion here | Barker: Bullock did not bar courts from deciding whether a plea was knowing and voluntary (which was adjudicated in 2015) | DPS: Bullock shows registration length is an administrative matter and agency expertise justifies a fresh determination | Held courts had authority to decide the voluntariness issue on appeal; Bullock does not defeat preclusion in this posture |
| Whether exception to preclusion for agencies with special competency (Heidemann/Grant) applies | Barker: No special DPS competency exists to determine statutory classification here; courts can decide whether an offense is an "aggravated offense" | DPS: Agency has statutory jurisdiction and expertise to determine registration classifications; thus preclusion shouldn’t bind it | Held exception inapplicable: no unique agency expertise was required to decide whether Barker’s offense met statutory definition of "aggravated offense" |
| Ripeness and intervening law arguments (e.g., 2009 statutory amendments) | Barker: The issue is ripe because the 2015 court of appeals already reviewed registration in adjudicating voluntariness; the DPS previously acted on the issue | DPS: Decision not ripe until ten years completed; intervening statutory changes justify re‑adjudication | Held not ripe argument rejected; statutory amendments did not change classification of Barker’s offense and do not justify a new determination |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 2002) (courts’ role in registry process is limited; length of registration is initially an administrative determination)
- Heidemann v. Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1985) (recognized exception to preclusion where an agency has special competency to redecide an issue)
- Grant v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 2006) (applied special‑competency exception to permit DHS to make independent child‑abuse determinations)
- Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17 (Iowa 2012) (standards for issue preclusion; elements to establish preclusive effect)
- Kruse v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 712 N.W.2d 695 (Iowa 2006) (courts may determine whether an offense meets the statutory definition requiring registration)