Rosenberry v. Evans
48 A.3d 1255
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2012Background
- Mother sues Landlord for negligence after her minor son was bitten by a dog on premises leased by Landlord's tenant.
- The dog (Raven) belonged to Tanya Evans, mother of the tenant’s girlfriend; the incident occurred during a puppy-picking visit by Alexander and his grandparents.
- Witnesses described Raven as friendly; the bite involved a clenching of the nose and a visible tic in Raven's jaw.
- Landlord moved for summary judgment, arguing no evidence of dangerous propensities or Landlord’s knowledge of any danger.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in Landlord’s favor, concluding no dangerous propensity and no knowledge by Landlord.
- Mother appeals, asserting Nanty-Glo issues and facts showing dangerous propensities and Landlord’s knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court correctly found no genuine issue on Raven's dangerous propensities. | Mother argues Raven had a tic and clenching propensity that could render her dangerous, creating a factual issue. | Landlord argues the dog lacked dangerous propensities and witnesses described a gentle dog. | Genuine issues exist regarding Raven's dangerous propensities; Nanty-Glo analysis not dispositive for this issue. |
| Whether Landlord had actual knowledge of Raven's dangerous propensities. | Mother contends knowledge could be inferred from agents or imputed to Landlord and from rumors. | Landlord did not have actual knowledge; knowledge cannot be imputed from limited handyman activities or hearsay rumors. | No evidence of actual knowledge; imputing knowledge from agents or rumors was insufficient; duty not established. |
| Whether Landlord owed a duty to the minor based on knowledge of a dangerous animal on leased premises. | Mother asserts Landlord’s duty arises from actual knowledge and control over premises with a dangerous dog. | Without actual knowledge and control, no duty attaches under Pennsylvania law. | Duty requires actual knowledge; court affirmed summary judgment on lack of knowledge, though issues of dangerous propensity remained. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 309 Pa. 236, 163 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1932) (directed verdicts based solely on oral testimony require jury-laid determinations; Nanty-Glo rule applies to summary judgment)
- Bremmer v. Protected Home Mut. Life Ins. Co., 436 Pa. 494, 260 A.2d 785 (Pa. 1970) (Nanty-Glo rule extends to summary judgment; credibility remains jury issue)
- Penn Center House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 520 Pa. 171, 553 A.2d 900 (Pa. 1989) (affidavits from moving party alone insufficient for summary judgment; credibility question persists)
- Palermo v. Nails, 334 Pa. Super. 544, 483 A.2d 871 (Pa. Super. 1984) (actual knowledge of a dangerous animal triggers duty; imputed knowledge not sufficient)
- Underwood ex rel. Underwood v. Wind, 954 A.2d 1199 (Pa. Super. 2008) (improper jury instruction can create reversible error; actual knowledge required for duty)
- Groner v. Hedrick, 403 Pa. 148, 169 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1961) (dangerous propensities include playful or mischievous acts; mood immaterial)
- Clark v. Clark, 207 Pa. Super. 193, 215 A.2d 293 (Pa. Super. 1965) (broad interpretation of dangerous propensities; not limited to viciousness)
- Johnson v. Johnson, 410 Pa. Super. 631, 600 A.2d 965 (Pa. Super. 1991) (co-defendants adverse for Nanty-Glo purposes; need actual adversity for testimony to count)
- Zator v. Coachi, 939 A.2d 349 (Pa. Super. 2007) (summary judgment proper where record fails to show prima facie claim or defense)
