Roseann Michelle Gill v. Grady Judd
941 F.3d 504
| 11th Cir. | 2019Background
- A 12-year-old girl (R.S.) died by suicide; Polk County deputies investigated and arrested her former friend and classmate (K.C.R.) at her home without a warrant for aggravated stalking of a minor.
- Deputy McKinney prepared an arrest affidavit summarizing interviews with four classmates; the affidavit linked alleged repeated bullying to emotional harm and supported probable cause.
- K.C.R. sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (inter alia) the arrest lacked probable cause and that deputies entered her home without consent; most claims were dismissed pretrial.
- The district court treated McKinney’s arrest affidavit (attached to the complaint) as part of the pleading and dismissed the no-probable-cause claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The sole claim tried to a jury was whether deputies had consent to enter the home; the jury found they did.
- On appeal K.C.R. challenged (1) dismissal of the probable-cause claim, (2) sufficiency of evidence of consent (and denial of JMOL/new trial), and (3) the district court’s response to a jury question about a screened-in porch; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dismissal of no-probable-cause claim (Rule 12(b)(6)) | Complaint plausibly alleged McKinney lacked probable cause; affidavit does not establish probable cause | Affidavit attached to complaint shows facts sufficient for probable cause | Affirmed — complaint fails to state a plausible lack-of-probable-cause claim once affidavit is considered; plaintiff may not raise new theories on appeal (timing of knowledge argument forfeited) |
| Use of arrest affidavit vs. complaint allegations | Allegations that affidavit is false/misleading should be credited; court must accept complaint’s statements | Court may consider exhibits attached to complaint and reject conclusory or contradicted allegations | Held: Court may construe attached affidavit; specific, well-pleaded allegations that contradict affidavit were credited, but general conclusory attacks were insufficient to avoid the affidavit’s legal effect |
| Consent to enter (jury sufficiency; JMOL/new trial) | Entry was nonconsensual — announcement that deputies were there to arrest coerced father; silence/acquiescence not consent | Father opened door, said he needed to put dog up, later opened door wide and stepped back — nonverbal implied consent; deputies used no force or warrants | Affirmed — reasonable jury could find voluntary consent by father; denial of JMOL and new trial not an abuse of discretion |
| Screened-in porch/curtilage and judge’s answer to jury | Porch is within curtilage; court’s answer that porch "is not part of the house" was erroneous and prejudicial | Porch issue was never litigated or pleaded; plaintiff’s counsel told court the porch was irrelevant, so issue waived; court properly answered given record | Affirmed — curtilage argument was forfeited/waived; court’s instruction was not reversible (plaintiff invited the ruling) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading requires plausible claim, not mere possibility)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (conclusory allegations need not be accepted)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (warrantless, nonconsensual home entry to make arrest presumptively unreasonable)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent voluntariness is a fact question under the totality of circumstances)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (consent coerced by claim of lawful authority is not consent)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (probable cause is a totality-of-circumstances, probability-based inquiry)
- United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744 (11th Cir.) (nonverbal body language can constitute implied consent to enter)
- Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir.) (opening door and stepping back can indicate consent to entry)