Rose Mary Knick v. Township of Scott
862 F.3d 310
3rd Cir.2017Background
- Township of Scott, PA enacted a cemetery ordinance requiring private cemeteries to be open to the public during daylight hours and authorizing code-enforcement officers to enter any property to determine existence/location of cemeteries; violations carried daily fines.
- On April 10, 2013 the Township’s Code Enforcement Officer entered Knick’s property without an administrative warrant, identified stones as grave markers, and issued a Notice of Violation; Knick disputes there is a cemetery.
- Knick sued (federal and state proceedings) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging Fourth Amendment (unreasonable searches) and Fifth Amendment (uncompensated taking) violations; state court stayed enforcement and later declined to decide the matter; Knick did not pursue inverse-condemnation (state eminent-domain) proceedings.
- The District Court dismissed Knick’s Fourth Amendment claims with prejudice and dismissed her takings claims without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies under Williamson County.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed: it held Knick lacks Article III standing for her facial Fourth Amendment challenge because she suffered no cognizable or imminent Fourth Amendment injury, and the Fifth Amendment takings claims are unripe until Knick seeks and is denied compensation through Pennsylvania inverse-condemnation procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for facial Fourth Amendment challenge | Knick: Ordinance authorizes warrantless, unrestrained searches (including curtilage) so she may challenge it on its face | Township: Knick’s own Fourth Amendment rights were not violated; future searches would be open-field and lawful; no imminent injury | Court: Knick lacks Article III standing; her search was lawful (open-field), and she showed no imminent, redressable curtilage invasion |
| Ability to bring facial Fourth Amendment claim without as-applied injury | Knick: facial challenge may proceed alone; early-stage pleading leniency supports standing | Township: must show personal, imminent injury; facial label does not relax standing rules | Court: Facial challenges require same Article III minima; without a concrete or imminent injury facial challenge fails |
| Ripeness of Fifth Amendment takings claim (finality/exhaustion) | Knick: facial takings claims are exempt from Williamson County exhaustion; her state-court suit sufficed; federal efficiency should excuse exhaustion | Township: Knick must seek just compensation via Pennsylvania inverse-condemnation proceedings before federal suit | Court: Williamson County applies to just-compensation claims; Knick’s claims seek compensation and are unripe until she pursues and is denied inverse-condemnation relief |
| Equitable waiver of Williamson County requirements | Knick: Williamson County’s prudential exhaustion can be excused for efficiency and to avoid piecemeal litigation | Township: no exceptional circumstances warrant waiver | Court: Declined to waive; no manipulation, futility, or other extraordinary equities shown; state inverse-condemnation is appropriate forum first |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (ripeness/just-compensation prudential rules: finality and state-remedy requirement)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (open-fields/curtilage principles and Fourth Amendment scope)
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (open-fields doctrine: no Fourth Amendment protection for open fields)
- Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (facial Fourth Amendment challenge approved where plaintiffs faced imminent warrantless searches)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (public-access easement as a physical taking)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (distinguishing takings challenge to invalidity of regulation from compensation claims)
- Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513 (discussion of ripeness and compensation; clarifies limits of Williamson County)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (an injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized)