ROSANNE L. WOODROOF v. JOSEPH F. CUNNINGHAM
147 A.3d 777
| D.C. | 2016Background
- Woodroof retained Cunningham in 2008 for D.C. litigation and signed a retainer containing an Arbitration Agreement covering “any dispute as to legal malpractice.”
- After settlement of the underlying suit, a fee dispute arose; Cunningham later sued Woodroof in Virginia and obtained a default judgment for unpaid fees, which Cunningham sought to register and enforce in D.C.
- Woodroof sued Cunningham for legal malpractice in D.C. Superior Court in 2013; Cunningham moved to stay and compel arbitration and the trial court granted the motion.
- Woodroof appealed the order compelling arbitration; Cunningham argued the D.C. Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order granting arbitration under the Home Rule Act.
- The Court of Appeals held it had jurisdiction under the RUAA (D.C. Code §16‑4427(a)(1)), concluded the arbitration clause covered Woodroof’s malpractice claim, and rejected Woodroof’s adhesion/unconscionability and waiver arguments.
- Separately, the Superior Court granted Woodroof relief from the Virginia judgment on grounds that the Arlington court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction due to D.C. Bar Rule XIII; both parties’ motions for contempt/sanctions were denied as the February 2013 order was ambiguous.
Issues
| Issue | Woodroof's Argument | Cunningham's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.C. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear appeal from an order granting arbitration under RUAA given Home Rule Act limits | §16‑4427(a)(1) is invalid as exceeding Council authority under the Home Rule Act | RUAA authorizes appeals from orders granting arbitration; appellate jurisdiction is proper | Court holds RUAA §16‑4427(a)(1) does not violate Home Rule Act and appellate jurisdiction exists |
| Whether the malpractice claim is arbitrable under the Arbitration Agreement | Agreement is ambiguous or selectively enforced; malpractice claim not subject to arbitration | Agreement explicitly covers legal malpractice; dispute fits clause | Arbitration clause is susceptible to covering the malpractice claim; arbitrability decided for arbitration |
| Whether the arbitration agreement is an unenforceable consumer adhesion/unconscionable contract | Agreement is adhesionary and unconscionable; Woodroof had no meaningful choice | Agreement was negotiated with counsel present; no evidence of lack of choice or inability to obtain alternative counsel | Appellant failed to prove adhesive/unconscionable contract; agreement enforceable |
| Whether trial court erred in denying motions for contempt/sanctions re: enforcement of Virginia judgment | Cunningham’s $75,000 demand to lift lien enforced the foreign judgment violating the court’s prior order; contempt warranted | Woodroof’s contempt and sanctions motions were frivolous or improper | Denials affirmed: order language ambiguous; no clear and convincing proof of contempt; motions for sanctions not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Brandon v. Hines, 439 A.2d 496 (D.C. 1981) (distinguishing appealability of orders denying vs granting stays pending arbitration)
- Koczak v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 439 A.2d 478 (D.C. 1981) (analyzing which arbitration‑related orders are "deemed final")
- Stuart v. Walker, 6 A.3d 1215 (D.C. 2010) (discussing Home Rule limits on Council authority; opinion later vacated but cited for analysis)
- Andrew v. Am. Imp. Ctr., 110 A.3d 626 (D.C. 2015) (holding orders compelling arbitration of adhesion‑contract consumer disputes may be appealable)
- Haynes v. Kuder, 591 A.2d 1286 (D.C. 1991) (standard for court review of arbitrability)
- Masurovsky v. Green, 687 A.2d 198 (D.C. 1997) (presumption to construe ambiguities in arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration)
- Woodland Ltd. P’ship v. Wulff, 868 A.2d 860 (D.C. 2005) (waiver of arbitration is presumptively for the arbitrator; ambiguity resolved against waiver)
- Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding substantive statutory changes that incidentally affect court caseloads do not necessarily alter court jurisdiction)
