Roossevelt Goguette v. U.S. Bank National Association
16-17017
| 11th Cir. | Nov 9, 2017Background
- Roossevelt and Kathleen Goguette (pro se) sued U.S. Bank, alleging it pursued foreclosure/eviction on their Dacula, GA home while Kathleen was in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and the automatic stay was in effect.
- Plaintiffs alleged U.S. Bank was listed as a creditor, received notice of the bankruptcy, served an eviction notice, demanded payment, and confirmed a foreclosure sale without obtaining relief from the stay.
- Plaintiffs asserted violations of the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362), of Georgia notice statute O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162, and sought emotional distress damages; they also briefly invoked due process (dismissed as inapplicable to a private bank).
- The magistrate judge recommended dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to plead Kathleen’s interest in the property and insufficient factual detail about U.S. Bank’s conduct and knowledge; emotional-distress claims were rejected as inadequately pleaded.
- The district court adopted the R&R and dismissed with prejudice; on appeal the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo, noting pro se liberal construction and that dismissal with prejudice requires giving pro se plaintiffs at least one chance to amend unless amendment is futile.
- The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding Plaintiffs’ later assertions (that both were on title and Kathleen listed the property in her bankruptcy schedules) meant amendment might cure defects; the court ordered the district court to give leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether foreclosure/eviction while Kathleen under Chapter 13 violated the automatic stay | Kathleen had an interest in the property and U.S. Bank acted after notice of bankruptcy, so actions violated § 362 | Plaintiffs failed to plead Kathleen’s legal/equitable interest or facts showing U.S. Bank’s knowledge/timing to support a § 362 claim | Courts: Plaintiffs failed to plead interest sufficiently, but given later assertions and pro se status, dismissal with prejudice was premature; remand for leave to amend |
| Whether plaintiffs alleged willful violation giving rise to damages under § 362(k) | U.S. Bank’s post-notice eviction/demand and sale confirmation caused injury and damages | Lack of factual specificity about defendant’s actions, timing, and knowledge prevents a plausible willful-violation claim | Dismissal denied as final disposition; plaintiffs may amend to add factual allegations supporting willfulness and damages |
| Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law | Bank’s conduct (eviction notice, demands, sale) caused severe emotional distress | Plaintiffs failed to plead conduct that was extreme/outrageous as required under Georgia law | Magistrate found pleading insufficient; appellate court did not foreclose amendment to cure the deficiency |
| Whether dismissal with prejudice was appropriate without leave to amend pro se complaint | Plaintiffs argued pro se status and subsequent statements about title justify chance to amend | Defendant relied on pleaded deficiencies to support dismissal | Court held pro se plaintiffs must be given at least one chance to amend absent futility; dismissal with prejudice was improper here |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003) (standard for reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108 (11th Cir. 1991) (pro se plaintiffs must be given leave to amend before dismissal with prejudice)
- Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998) (courts construe pro se pleadings liberally)
- Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002) (limiting scope of some pro se amendment rules for counseled plaintiffs)
- S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (private parties are not subject to the Fifth Amendment)