Roosevelt Moore v. M. Biter
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16321
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- In 1991, Roosevelt Brian Moore (age 16 at the time) was convicted of multiple nonhomicide sexual and related offenses and sentenced to consecutive term-of-years totaling 254 years and 4 months; parole eligibility is after serving half (127 years, 2 months), effectively never.
- At sentencing the trial judge credited a psychologist who opined Moore would remain dangerous; other clinicians found Moore capable of rehabilitation and motivated to change.
- Moore exhausted state habeas remedies; after Graham v. Florida (2010) he filed state and federal habeas petitions challenging the de facto life-without-parole sentence; state courts rejected his claims and the district court denied federal relief, treating Graham as non-retroactive.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Graham applies retroactively on collateral review and whether the state court’s rejection of Moore’s Graham claim was contrary to clearly established federal law under AEDPA § 2254(d)(1).
- The Ninth Circuit held Graham is retroactive under Teague’s exception for rules that prohibit a category of punishment for a class of defendants, and concluded Moore’s aggregate term-of-years sentence is materially indistinguishable from a life-without-parole sentence prohibited by Graham.
- The court reversed the district court, held the state court decision was contrary to Graham, and remanded with instructions to grant Moore’s habeas petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Graham apply retroactively on collateral review? | Graham creates a categorical rule prohibiting life-without-parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders and fits Teague’s exception. | Graham is a new rule and should not apply retroactively to final convictions. | Graham is retroactive under Teague because it bars a category of punishment for a class defined by status and offense. |
| Was the state court decision contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1)? | The Court of Appeal erred by refusing to apply Graham to Moore’s de facto life sentence (254 years) for juvenile nonhomicide crimes. | Moore’s sentence is a term-of-years for multiple violent offenses and therefore distinguishable from Graham. | The state court decision was contrary to Graham; Moore’s sentence is materially indistinguishable from life without parole and unconstitutional. |
| Does Graham’s categorical bar exclude violent nonhomicide offenses (e.g., rape with a firearm)? | Graham’s bar applies to all juvenile nonhomicide offenses regardless of severity; statutes imposing LWOP for serious nonhomicide crimes were among those the Court evaluated. | Serious violent nonhomicide crimes warrant different treatment; Moore’s violent sexual offenses are distinguishable. | Graham draws the single line between homicide and nonhomicide; severity does not exempt violent nonhomicide offenses from Graham’s ban. |
| Must petitioner return to state court in light of intervening state precedent (e.g., Caballero)? | Moore had exhausted state remedies and should not be required to return to state court to obtain relief. | State remedies might be appropriate to apply new state precedent first. | Courts should not require return to state court where petitioner has already exhausted remedies; federal habeas relief ordered. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity framework for new constitutional rules on collateral review)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles are less culpable; relevant psychological differences between juveniles and adults)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (reiterates Graham’s bar as a flat ban on life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (new rules apply retroactively on collateral review only in limited circumstances)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (AEDPA does not require near-identical factual patterns before applying Supreme Court precedent)