Ronnie Lamont Harshaw v. State of Tennessee, E2015-00900-CCA-R3-PC

Ronnie Lamont Harshaw pled guilty to multiple offenses (including two counts of attempted first-degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault) pursuant to a plea agreement yielding an effective 36-year sentence.
At plea hearing the State gave a factual basis including identification, gun/ammunition evidence, and that Harshaw was a documented Vice Lords member; the plea incorporated application of Tennessee Code Ann. § 40-35-121 (criminal gang enhancement) to elevate aggravated assault from Class C to Class B.
Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary; he also later challenged the gang-enhancement statute as unconstitutional.
The post-conviction court credited trial counsel’s testimony about investigation, plea discussions, and that the plea was explained and voluntarily entered; it denied relief.
On appeal this court affirmed denial of post-conviction relief as to counsel performance and voluntariness of the pleas, but held (following State v. Bonds) that § 40-35-121(b) is facially unconstitutional for lacking a nexus requirement between gang membership and the offense.
Remedy: vacate the gang enhancements on the three aggravated-assault convictions, reduce each to a Class C felony (15-year sentence) to be served concurrently; total effective sentence remains 36 years.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to investigate / advise)	Harshaw: counsel failed to investigate witnesses, explain plea terms, or advise re: sentencing; coerced plea	State: counsel investigated, reviewed discovery, discussed risks and plea; client chose to plead	Denied — court credited counsel; petitioner failed to show deficient performance or prejudice
Knowing and voluntary pleas	Harshaw: medication, poor communication, and rushed signing rendered plea unknowing/unvoluntary	State: plea colloquy shows petitioner understood rights, waived them knowingly; counsel advised	Denied — petitioner’s in-court plea statements and court’s inquiries created strong presumption of voluntariness
Constitutionality of criminal gang enhancement (§ 40-35-121(b))	Harshaw: statute lacks requirement that offense be gang-related (no nexus), violating substantive due process	State: initially argued waiver; otherwise defended statute	Held unconstitutional — statute imposes harsher punishment based solely on gang membership without nexus to the offense; reversed/enhancements vacated
Retroactivity & Remedy	Harshaw: Bonds should apply retroactively to vacate enhancements	State: argued waiver and procedural default	Held Bonds announces a new rule to be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-122; enhancements vacated and aggravated-assault convictions reclassified to Class C (15 years each) with no change to total effective sentence

State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (holding § 40-35-121(b) unconstitutional for lacking nexus between gang membership and the offense)
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (U.S. 1961) (limitations on imputation of guilt based solely on membership in an organization)
Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn.) (retroactivity standard for new constitutional rules in post-conviction proceedings)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (prejudice in guilty-plea context requires showing that but for counsel’s errors the defendant would have insisted on trial)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (U.S. 1977) (a defendant’s solemn in-court plea statements carry a strong presumption of verity)