Ronnie Hue Montgomery v. State
03-15-00203-CR
| Tex. App. | Dec 7, 2016Background
- Ronnie Hue Montgomery was indicted for evading arrest with a vehicle (third-degree felony) and represented himself at trial with standby counsel; jury convicted and recommended five years confinement but recommended community supervision, and the trial court suspended sentence and placed him on community supervision.
- Montgomery filed a written waiver of counsel on January 26, 2015; the trial court appointed standby counsel shortly thereafter and standby counsel remained available throughout trial.
- On the morning of jury selection (March 2, 2015) the trial court conducted on-the-record admonishments: warned Montgomery of the risks and disadvantages of self-representation, explained standby counsel’s limited role (no hybrid representation), confirmed Montgomery’s understanding, and Montgomery repeatedly affirmed he wanted to proceed pro se.
- Standby counsel consulted with Montgomery, made bench arguments/objections, questioned Montgomery when he testified, and otherwise assisted in limited ways but did not engage in hybrid representation at trial.
- On appeal Montgomery argued his waiver was invalid because there is no record of Faretta warnings given before his written waiver and there was no affirmative showing he was literate, competent, and knowingly waived counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Montgomery’s waiver of counsel was valid under Faretta | Montgomery: No record of Faretta warnings before his written waiver; waiver not shown to be knowing, intelligent, voluntary | State: Trial court gave extensive on-the-record Faretta admonitions before trial and standby counsel was appointed and available | Court: Waiver was valid — admonitions and confirmations on the record before and during jury selection, and totality of circumstances show waiver was knowing and intelligent |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has constitutional right to self-representation; must be warned of dangers and disadvantages so waiver is knowing and intelligent)
- Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (right to self-representation must be clearly and unequivocally asserted; totality of circumstances govern validity of waiver)
- Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (record should reflect admonishments given prior to any act of self-representation)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver must be knowing and intelligent considering the particular facts and circumstances)
- Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (trial court need not follow a rigid script when evaluating a waiver of counsel)
- Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (legal competence to conduct trial is not required; key is competence to decide to represent oneself)