Ronnie Dancer v. Clark Construction Company Inc
153830
Mich.May 19, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Ronnie Dancer fell 35–40 feet from a scaffold made with unsecured planks lacking supporting bridges and outriggers, and was not wearing available fall-protection equipment.
- Case involves whether a general contractor (Clark Construction) can be liable under the "common work area" doctrine for subcontractor-related hazards.
- At issue in the Court's consideration was element three of the doctrine: whether the danger created a "high degree of risk to a significant number of workers."
- The Court of Appeals found genuine issues of material fact precluding summary disposition; the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal but provided guidance in a concurrence by Chief Justice Markman.
- Markman concurred because factual disputes remain about (a) how many workers were exposed to the same danger, (b) whether the general contractor negligently constructed the scaffold, (c) whether the contractor failed to ensure use of fall protection, and (d) causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How to define the relevant "danger" for element three of the common work area doctrine | The danger includes lack of fall-protection on the scaffold with unsecured planks; many workers were exposed to that risk | The relevant danger was the specific act by Dancer (improperly overlapped planking) that only exposed him | Court (Markman, C.J.): Danger should be defined to include use/failure to use available safety equipment in confronting unavoidable site hazards (not a worker's unrelated negligence); factual issues remain so summary disposition inappropriate |
| Whether defining danger to include plaintiff's negligent acts defeats recovery | Plaintiff: worker negligence unrelated to failure to use safety equipment should be treated under comparative negligence, not as part of the danger definition | Defendant: plaintiff-created hazard means no significant number of workers were exposed | Held: Including plaintiff's negligence (other than failure to use available safety equipment) in the danger definition would effectively revive contributory negligence and is inappropriate; assess such negligence in comparative-negligence analysis |
| Whether the scope of the danger should be broad (e.g., heights) or narrow (specific act) | Plaintiff: danger must be narrow enough to measure how many workers faced it but not so narrow as to be meaningless | Defendant: favors very narrow characterization tied to plaintiff's conduct | Held: Danger must be defined to reflect equipment/procedures available to mitigate unavoidable site hazards—narrower than merely "heights" but broader than the worker's specific misstep |
| Appropriateness of summary disposition on common work area claim | Plaintiff: factual disputes exist on exposure, contractor negligence, enforcement of fall protection, and causation | Defendant: argues only plaintiff faced the true danger, so no significant-number exposure | Held: Genuine disputes of material fact exist; summary disposition is inappropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc., 471 Mich. 45 (recognizes common-work-area exception to nonliability of general contractors)
- Latham v. Barton Malow Co., 480 Mich. 105 (defines relevant danger as working at heights without fall-protection equipment)
- Latham v. Barton Malow Co., 497 Mich. 993 (dissent discussing proper granularity for danger definition)
- Funk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 392 Mich. 91 (supports imposing safety responsibility on general contractors to encourage precautions)
- Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638 (adopts comparative negligence in Michigan)
- Hardy v. Monsanto Enviro-Chem Sys., Inc., 414 Mich. 29 (holds comparative negligence applies in construction context)
- Ghaffari v. Turner Constr. Co., 473 Mich. 16 (refuses to apply open-and-obvious doctrine to common-work-area claims to avoid restoring contributory negligence)