Ronnie Coleman, Jr. v. Academy Bus LLC
20-2671
| 3rd Cir. | Sep 15, 2021Background
- Ronnie Coleman, Jr., pro se, sued after an arrest he says resulted from a bus driver’s false statement and alleged custodial abuse (forced to stand barefoot in freezing weather; slammed into a wall; struck, kicked, and sprayed with mace).
- Defendants named: the bus company, South Amboy Police Department, Middlesex County Jail, and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office; Coleman invoked the New Jersey Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) and various New Jersey criminal statutes and sought $50,000.
- The bus company answered and asserted cross-claims for contribution and indemnification; those cross-claims were later voluntarily dismissed.
- The District Court granted Coleman in forma pauperis but dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), reasoning the cited state criminal statutes and APSA do not create a private right of action.
- The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims under the cited New Jersey statutes and APSA but vacated in part and remanded because the District Court failed to offer Coleman leave to amend; the panel concluded Coleman might be able to plead viable § 1983 claims based on his factual allegations.
- The Court confirmed appellate jurisdiction after the bus company’s voluntary dismissal of its cross-claims resolved any finality concerns.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do the cited NJ criminal statutes create a private right of action? | Coleman relied on those statutes to remedy arrest and mistreatment. | Criminal statutes do not create private causes of action; enforcement is criminal, not privately enforceable. | No private right; dismissal affirmed. |
| Does the APSA provide a private cause of action for Coleman’s alleged treatment? | Coleman invoked APSA as a basis for relief. | APSA authorizes protective-service providers to pursue relief, not individual private suits for these claims. | APSA does not furnish Coleman a private claim; dismissal affirmed. |
| Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not offering leave to amend? | Coleman (pro se) should be afforded leave to amend to assert cognizable claims (e.g., § 1983). | District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim without granting or explaining denial of amendment. | Court abused its discretion by not offering amendment; vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. |
| Was there appellate jurisdiction despite pending cross-claims at time of appeal? | Coleman filed appeal; jurisdiction questioned because cross-claims existed. | Outstanding cross-claims can make an order non-final. | Jurisdiction existed after the bus company voluntarily dismissed its cross-claims; appeal proceeded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (refused to infer private right of action from bare criminal statute)
- Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (private parties generally cannot compel criminal-law enforcement)
- In re Farnkopf, 833 A.2d 89 (N.J. App. Div.) (APSA authorizes providers, not broad private suits by individuals)
- Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247 (district courts must offer amendment to pro se plaintiffs unless futile or inequitable)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (standards for denying leave to amend: undue delay, bad faith, futility, etc.)
- Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220 (de novo review of sua sponte dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii))