Ronnel e. Barrett v. Hecla Mining Co
161 Idaho 205
| Idaho | 2016Background
- On November 16, 2011 a rock burst occurred at the Lucky Friday Mine (5900 level). Hecla halted operations, notified MSHA, hired a rock-mechanics expert (Blake), and devised a two-phase rehabilitation plan approved by MSHA.
- Phase 1 (bolts, mesh, shotcrete) was completed December 1, 2011; Phase 2 (steel liners) was delayed until liners arrived December 12. Work resumed to install liners beginning December 14, 2011.
- Appellants (miners) were assigned to install the steel liner on December 14; a rock burst that evening injured them.
- Appellants sued alleging Hecla knowingly exposed them to a dangerous area and committed “willful or unprovoked physical aggression,” seeking to avoid the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act (IWCA) exclusivity bar.
- The district court granted Hecla summary judgment, concluding the conduct at most showed negligence and there was no evidence Hecla specifically intended to harm employees or had actual knowledge a rock burst would occur.
- On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning the IWCA exclusivity exception for "willful or unprovoked physical aggression" was not met by the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IWCA exclusivity is displaced by the §72-209(3) exception for "willful or unprovoked physical aggression" | Hecla knew pillar was unstable and likely to burst, yet ordered miners into the area — this is willful/unprovoked aggression and defeats exclusivity | No evidence Hecla specifically intended harm or actually knew a rock burst would occur; actions amount to negligence only, so IWCA exclusivity applies | Held for Hecla: exclusivity bars the tort claims because plaintiff failed to show specific intent or actual knowledge that injury would occur |
| What standard governs "willful" vs "unprovoked" physical aggression | Appellants rely on a broad formulation that exposing employees to a known dangerous condition can satisfy the exception | Court (following Marek) requires either: (a) specific intent to injure (willful) or (b) actual knowledge or conscious disregard that injury would result (unprovoked) | Court applies Marek standard and finds plaintiffs did not meet either standard |
| Sufficiency of expert reports/stress measurements to show actual knowledge of imminent rock burst | Appellants claim stress readings and expert opinions show Hecla knew collapse/rock burst was likely | Hecla’s experts and Blake testified readings were not predictive of imminent failure; Blake’s report said large burst was "very unlikely" though not impossible | Held that the measurements and report do not establish actual knowledge of impending failure; thus insufficient to trigger exception |
| Whether employer's omissions/unsafe implementation (e.g., incomplete gauges, resumed blasting) amount to "unprovoked physical aggression" | Appellants point to incomplete installation of stress gauges, defective gauge, resumed blasting, and MSHA citations to show aggravated conduct and conscious disregard | Hecla contends these show negligence or poor implementation of a rehabilitation plan, not intent or actual knowledge of imminent harm | Held omissions/implementation failures—even if negligent or aggravated—do not meet the high threshold for the §72-209(3) exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 294 P.3d 184 (Idaho 2013) (summary-judgment standard and appellate review)
- Marek v. Hecla, 161 Idaho 211, 384 P.3d 975 (Idaho 2016) (defines "willful" and "unprovoked" physical aggression standards)
- Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938 (Idaho 2005) (discussed as distinguishable on facts where exception applied)
- DeMoss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 (Idaho 1990) (employer's concealment of hazard and inadequate protection held insufficient for "physical aggression")
- Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755, 760 P.2d 1171 (Idaho 1988) (IWCA generally provides exclusive remedy)
- Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 146 Idaho 408, 179 P.3d 1064 (Idaho 2008) (rules on drawing inferences for summary judgment)
