Ronel Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General
709 F.3d 1066
| 11th Cir. | 2013Background
- Ramos, a Philippine citizen and lawful permanent resident, pled guilty to Georgia shoplifting statute Ga. Code Ann. § 16-8-14 and was sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment to be served on probation.
- The U.S. Attorney General charged Ramos with removability, alleging an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on the Georgia shoplifting conviction, and a second removal ground under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for two or more crimes involving moral turpitude.
- An IJ sustained removability and denied cancellation of removal; the Board dismissed Ramos’s appeal, holding the Georgia statute necessarily constitutes an aggravated felony.
- The Board’s ruling rested on treating the Georgia statute as a categorically qualifying theft offense under § 1101(a)(43)(G).
- Ramos challenged the Board’s classification, arguing the Georgia statute is divisible and may not categorically qualify as a theft offense; the court must examine the record of conviction if divisible.
- The Eleventh Circuit held the Georgia statute is divisible and that Ramos’s record of conviction does not establish a theft offense, so he is not removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); remanded for consideration under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Ga. § 16-8-14 divisible for theft purposes? | Ramos argues the statute is divisible, with some conduct not constituting theft. | The Government contends the statute is a theft offense on its face. | Statute is divisible. |
| Does the Georgia statute’s record establish a theft offense? | Record shows only the Georgia charge language, not a specific theft offense. | Record would show theft if the pleaded/convicted conduct fell within theft. | Record does not establish a theft offense. |
| Does Ramos’s conviction under Ga. § 16-8-14 qualify as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(G)? | Conviction is a theft offense, thus an aggravated felony. | Conviction may be non-theft within the generic definition if divisible. | No; not a theft offense, so not an aggravated felony. |
| What is the controlling method to classify a conviction under a divisible statute in this context? | Classification should rely on the record if divisible. | Classification can rely on statutory language and record as needed. | Record-dependent analysis applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defines generic meaning of 'theft offense')
- Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (theft offense defined by generic meaning; divisibility framework)
- Jaggernauth v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2005) (divisible statutes require record to establish theft offense)
- K-Mart Corp. v. Coker, 410 S.E.2d 425 (Ga. 1991) (Georgia case recognizing alternate mens rea forms)
- In re V-Z-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1338 (BIA 2000) (board interpretive guidance on theft offenses)