80 A.3d 211
D.C.2013Background
- On July 28, 2008, Ronald Wynn shot Daniel Clark after a prior verbal/physical dispute; Wynn fled and later asked his girlfriend Veronica (through her daughter Brittany) to provide a false alibi.
- Wynn was tried twice: at the first trial the jury convicted him of CPWL, FIP, UF, UA, and obstruction of justice but hung on first-degree murder and PFCV; at a second trial he was convicted of PFCV and voluntary manslaughter while armed.
- The obstruction charge was premised on D.C. Code § 22-722(a)(3)(B) — alleging Wynn “harassed” Veronica to dissuade reporting to police.
- At the first trial the court gave an anti-deadlock (Winters) instruction; the jury sent notes and returned partial verdicts before being dismissed and later hung on remaining counts. Wynn moved for a mistrial on all counts, which was denied.
- At the second trial Wynn sought to call Terrence Brooks to corroborate self-defense; Brooks had given grand jury testimony denying knowledge and his counsel said Brooks would invoke the Fifth if called without immunity. The court allowed Brooks to assert the privilege and he did not testify.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Wynn "harassed" Veronica in violation of § 22-722(a)(3)(B) | Government: Wynn asked Veronica (via Brittany) to provide a false alibi, intending to dissuade reporting — this satisfies harassment under the statute | Wynn: His request was a single, non-threatening plea to a close partner that did not objectively "harass" or alarm Veronica | Reversed obstruction conviction — the harassment prong requires more than a one-time, mild request; evidence did not show objective badgering, threat, or alarm |
| Alleged juror coercion / denial of mistrial after partial verdicts at first trial | Wynn: Court’s silence after jury notes and the Winters charge coerced holdout jurors on the counts decided (CPWL, FIP, UF, UA, obstruction) | Government: Jury struggled only on murder; notes and court responses were reasonable and indicated unanimous verdicts on other counts | Affirmed convictions from first trial — no abuse of discretion; record shows no inherent coercive potential as to the counts convicted |
| Exclusion of Terrence Brooks’s testimony via Fifth Amendment claim | Wynn: Court should have parsed testimony question-by-question to admit non-incriminating portions beneficial to defense | Government: Brooks’s proffered testimony contradicted grand jury testimony, risking perjury; debriefing was reasonable precondition to immunity; Brooks could validly claim the privilege | Affirmed trial court — Brooks’s testimony would be incriminating and perjury-exposure justified the privilege; court’s practical refusal to parse was acceptable and harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258 (D.C. 1996) (defines "harass" to include words or actions that badger, disturb, or pester an ordinary person)
- Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1996) (procedural framework for balancing defendant's right to compulsory process and witness's Fifth Amendment privilege)
- Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530 (D.C. 1974) (en banc) (approved anti-deadlock jury instruction)
- Smith v. United States, 591 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1991) (obstruction statute covers participants, potential or actual, in pending criminal proceedings)
- Butler v. United States, 890 A.2d 181 (D.C. 2006) (Fifth Amendment privilege extends to specific questions; blanket invocations discouraged)
- Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1979) (words in statutes are given their ordinary meaning)
- Wynn v. United States, 48 A.3d 181 (D.C. 2012) (discusses scope of "official proceeding" for obstruction purposes)