Ronald Slade v. Board of School Dir
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26433
| 7th Cir. | 2012Background
- Estate of Kamonie Slade and his parents sued Wisconsin school district officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourteenth Amendment due process violation from Kamonie's drowning during a school field trip.
- Gosz (principal) and Estes (assistant principal) organized/led the field trip; no lifeguard was present and district rules required one for swimming on trips.
- Parents granted permission slips noting “playing in the water”; chaperones, including Pitta, supervised but lacked lifeguard certification and Kamonie was a poor swimmer.
- Kamonie, 12, entered designated swimming area; drowned when water depth and current exceeded his ability; others attempted rescue after Pitta asked for supervision.
- District argued immunity/limits on liability and plaintiffs asserted a due process violation due to staff conduct creating or failing to avert danger; district court granted summary judgment for defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether due process liability attaches to government actors who create or fail to avert danger. | Estate argues reckless action by staff caused danger. | Gosz/Estes contend negligence, not cognizable under due process. | No due process liability; negligence not enough; reckless action required. |
| What standard governs danger-creation liability in this context (recklessness vs. deliberate indifference) | Knowledge of risk or deliberate indifference should suffice. | Risk must be obvious or known; recklessness suffices if criteria met. | Adopts a recklessness standard; negligence/gross negligence not sufficient; knowledge not required if risk obvious. |
| Whether enticement or “trap” theories apply to create liability for state actors | Staff enticed Kamonie into danger by inviting him to swim. | Enticement not proven; actions were negligent, not deliberate endangerment. | Enticement theory rejected; liability not based on mere negligence. |
| Whether government must have committed an affirmative act to trigger due process liability | Any affirmative action increasing danger suffices. | Liability not predicated on mere exposure; actions in planning and supervision matter. | Affirmative act concept rejected as necessary; liability requires dangerous conduct meeting the recklessness standard. |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (reckless conduct or shocking the conscience standards discussed)
- Dykema v. Skoumal, 261 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2001) (assistance in danger does not automatically create liability unless recklessness present)
- Doe v. St. Francis School District, 694 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2012) (recklessness scope—risk need not be known to defendant)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (due process limits on state actor responsibility for private harm)
- Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (negative liberties; limits on federal liability for public-safety decisions)