Ronald Rajo v. Jefferson Sessions
695 F. App'x 222
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Petitioners Ronald H. Rajo, Olly F. Rogahang, and Oscean S. Rajo are Seventh Day Adventists from Indonesia who applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection based on religious persecution.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a final order of removal on April 27, 2007; the petitioners moved to reopen on January 10, 2012 (untimely under the 90‑day rule).
- Petitioners relied on evidence of worsening conditions for Christians in Indonesia (news articles and expert testimony) and argued changed country conditions excused the untimeliness.
- Petitioners also invoked Ninth Circuit precedent recognizing Indonesian Christians as a disfavored group, arguing this relaxed the individualized-risk requirement.
- The BIA denied the untimely motion to reopen, finding petitioners failed to present material, particularized evidence showing individualized risk; the government did not oppose the motion but the BIA denied on substantive grounds.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and substantial evidence and denied the petition for review, concluding the BIA did not abuse its discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Petitioners' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the untimely motion to reopen is excused by changed country conditions in Indonesia | Worsening conditions for Christians in Indonesia show changed country conditions warrant reopening | Evidence is general and does not show material, particularized change or individualized risk to petitioners | Denied—petitioners failed to show material, individualized changed country conditions |
| Whether membership in a disfavored group (Indonesian Christians) relieves individualized-risk requirement | Ninth Circuit law recognizing Indonesian Christians as disfavored group lowers burden to show individualized risk | Even assuming disfavored‑group status, petitioners still must show individualized risk; they failed to do so | Denied—BIA assumed disfavored‑group status but found individualized risk insufficient |
| Whether the BIA erred by not addressing the government's failure to oppose the motion | Government’s non‑opposition should weigh in favor of reopening | Government’s non‑opposition is immaterial if petitioners did not meet substantive burden | Denied—non‑opposition irrelevant because BIA denied on substantive grounds |
| Standard of review for motion to reopen | N/A (procedural) | N/A | Ninth Circuit reviews BIA denial for abuse of discretion and factual findings for substantial evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Oyeniran v. Holder, 672 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for motions to reopen)
- Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2010) (substantial-evidence review of changed country conditions)
- Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010) (changed country conditions must be particular to the petitioner)
- Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004) (requirements for individualized risk in asylum context)
- Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (effect of disfavored‑group status on individualized‑risk showing)
- Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (burden on alien to present material evidence of changed conditions)