Ronald Oyenik v. Corizon Health Inc., 696 F. App'x 792

Plaintiff Ronald Oyenik, an Arizona state prisoner, sued Corizon Health, a private contractor providing medical care to prisoners, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (prostate cancer) in violation of the Eighth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court found triable issues that Corizon acted with deliberate indifference causing harm but granted summary judgment to Corizon for lack of evidence showing an official Corizon policy or custom.
Oyenik presented evidence of at least a dozen instances over about a year where Corizon denied or delayed consultations, biopsies, and radiation treatment related to his prostate cancer.
The key legal question was whether those repeated denials/delays could support municipal-style (Monell) liability against a private contractor acting under color of state law.
The Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Monell standards apply to private entities acting for the state and evaluated whether Oyenik showed an official policy or custom of deliberate indifference by Corizon.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Corizon acted under color of state law	Corizon provided state-contract medical services, so its actions are attributable to the State	Corizon contested Monell liability (district court required policy/custom evidence)	Court: Corizon acted under color of state law (West/Estelle)
Whether a constitutional violation occurred (deliberate indifference)	Oyenik showed deliberate indifference and resulting harm through delays/denials	Corizon argued absence of deliberate indifference or actionable policy	Court: District court correctly found triable issues on deliberate indifference and harm
Whether Monell liability requires a policy/custom and whether evidence met that standard	Oyenik argued the repeated denials/delays (≥12 incidents) toward him could establish a custom/practice of deliberate indifference	Corizon argued isolated incidents insufficient; no pattern showing policy or practice	Court: Reversed district court—a reasonable jury could infer a Corizon custom from the pattern toward a single inmate; summary judgment improperly granted
Whether proof of a custom must show widespread incidents beyond a single plaintiff	Oyenik argued a pattern against one person can show a custom	Corizon relied on precedent that isolated acts are insufficient	Court: Held no rule forbids inferring a custom from repeated conduct toward one individual; factual dispute for jury

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official policy or custom)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (medical care provided by private physician under contract is attributable to the State)
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment)
Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (entity liable under § 1983 only if policy/practice is moving force behind constitutional violation)
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128 (Monell standard applies to private entities acting under color of state law; court assumed applicability here)
Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712 (random acts/isolated events insufficient to establish custom)
Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (custom must be sufficiently persistent, frequent, and consistent)
Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470 (pattern toward single individual can support inference of custom in appropriate circumstances)
Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230 (one or two incidents insufficient to establish custom)
Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102 (isolated incidents do not establish municipal custom)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (states are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment)