Ronald Kramer v. Mary Cullinan
878 F.3d 1156
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Kramer served dual roles as Executive Director of Jefferson Public Radio (Public Radio) and the JPR Foundation, reporting to SOU President Dr. Mary Cullinan.
- An audit flagged conflicts of interest and financial risk from Foundation projects and recommended separating the two roles; Dr. Cullinan sought to eliminate the conflict.
- Kramer proposed board resolutions to change SOU–Foundation relations and secure his position; Dr. Cullinan’s counsel (Miller Nash) sent a letter to Foundation counsel warning of legal risks and limited indemnification if actions were later found to be in "bad faith" or involving "willful misconduct."
- The Miller Nash Letter was distributed at a public Foundation board meeting attended by press; the next day Dr. Cullinan gave Kramer notice that his appointment might not be renewed and later notified him of non-renewal.
- Kramer challenged non-renewal internally (received 90 days’ pay for defective notice) and sued, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest deprivation based on public stigmatizing statements in the Miller Nash Letter; the district court denied qualified immunity to Dr. Cullinan.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed: it held the Miller Nash Letter did not actually impute misconduct sufficient to be stigmatizing, and even if it did, the law was not clearly established that such conditional language required a name-clearing hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Miller Nash Letter contained "stigmatizing" charges that impaired Kramer’s reputation | Kramer: Letter imputed bad faith/willful misconduct and suggested lack of indemnity, publicly connected to his termination | Cullinan: Letter used conditional language warning of potential legal consequences; it did not affirmatively accuse Kramer of fraud/dishonesty | Held: Letter did not affirmatively impute stigmatizing misconduct; characterization as stigmatizing was erroneous |
| Whether public disclosure occurred in connection with termination | Kramer: Letter was public at Board meeting and temporally linked to non-renewal | Cullinan: Disputation limited to whether content was stigmatizing; disclosure and timing assumed by court for analysis | Held: Court assumed connection for analysis but found no constitutional violation because no stigmatizing charge |
| Whether a liberty interest violation occurred (name-clearing hearing required) | Kramer: Stigmatizing public statements during termination process entitle him to a name-clearing hearing | Cullinan: No stigmatizing statements; qualified immunity bars suit | Held: No clearly established liberty interest was violated because the statements were not stigmatizing |
| Whether qualified immunity applies (clearly established law) | Kramer: Precedent establishes that accusing employee of fraud/dishonesty requires name-clearing; applies here | Cullinan: Precedent did not place conditional warnings about indemnity or breach of fiduciary duty "beyond debate" as stigmatizing | Held: Qualified immunity applies — no controlling precedent made this conditional language clearly violative of constitutional rights |
Key Cases Cited
- Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 2017) (standard for qualified immunity review on summary judgment)
- Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2009) (employer accusations of fraud can implicate liberty interest)
- Tibbets v. Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529 (9th Cir. 2009) (public statements referencing ethics/honesty may be stigmatizing)
- Cox v. Roskelley, 359 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004) (public disclosure of termination letter with stigmatizing allegations can require name-clearing)
- Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476 (9th Cir. 1996) (stigmatizing charges are questions of fact for liberty interest claims)
- Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist., 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissal for "offensive conduct" implicated liberty interest)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may address either prong of qualified immunity first)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (clearly established law must be particularized to the facts)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (defining clearly established legal contours for qualified immunity)