Ronald Glick v. Dave Edwards
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17565
9th Cir.2015Background
- Plaintiff Ron D. Glick was convicted in 2005 in Montana and thereafter filed numerous pro se suits alleging a broad governmental conspiracy to persecute him.
- In this action Glick alleged eight claims against 19 defendants, naming (among others) probation officer Dave Edwards, Judges Donald W. Molloy and Jeremiah C. Lynch, the United States District Court for the District of Montana, and essentially every judge in that district.
- Magistrate Judge Lynch screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), concluded claims against the judges were frivolous or barred (leaving only § 1983 claims against Edwards), and recommended no recusal despite the judges being named as defendants.
- District Judge Molloy adopted the recommendation; Edwards prevailed at trial on the remaining claim and the jury returned a verdict for Edwards; Glick appealed pro se.
- The principal issue on appeal was whether Judges Molloy and Lynch abused their discretion by refusing to recuse themselves when named as defendants; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, invoking the rule of necessity because Glick had sued all judges of the district.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judges named as defendants must disqualify under § 455(b)(5)(i) | Glick: naming Molloy and Lynch (and the District Court) required their recusal and entitles him to a panel designated by the Chief Justice | Judges: claims against them are frivolous/immuned; judges may refuse recusal; practical necessity and precedent allow them to sit | Held: Court did not rest on § 455(b)(5)(i) absolute rule; instead applied rule of necessity — when a litigant sues all judges of a tribunal, none are required to recuse; affirmed |
| Whether § 455(b)(5)(i) permits discretion where claims are frivolous | Glick: automatic disqualification when judge is a party | Judges: judicial immunity and other doctrines make claims frivolous, permitting refusal to recuse; practical limits on plaintiff’s remedies | Held: Court declined to decide the broader discretionary question; affirmed on necessity grounds instead |
Key Cases Cited
- Ignacio v. Judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (applied rule of necessity where litigant sued all judges of a circuit)
- United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (discusses rule allowing ordinarily disqualified judges to hear cases when necessary)
- Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (noting certain statutory disqualifications require automatic recusal)
- United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1986) (recusal standard: whether a reasonable person would question judge’s impartiality)
- United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2012) (recusal review is for abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (abuse-of-discretion standard explained)