Ronald Eugene Reynolds v. State
08-15-00372-CR
| Tex. App. | Nov 29, 2017Background
- Ronald E. Reynolds (Appellant), a Houston-area personal-injury lawyer, was convicted of five misdemeanor barratry counts for permitting a third party (Robert Valdez) to solicit clients within 31 days of traffic accidents.
- Valdez and his ex-wife operated a scheme: obtain recent accident reports, contact not-at-fault motorists, steer them to Valdez-controlled clinics and to lawyers in exchange for cash referral fees; Valdez pled guilty and testified against several attorneys.
- For the five charged clients (including Kuh Taw), intake forms, executed fee agreements on Reynolds letterhead, and collision reports showed clients were contacted and signed within 7–15 days after accidents; some file entries showing "referred by Robert" had been whited-out.
- Evidence included security video of Valdez at Reynolds’s office, text messages discussing "pick ups" and coded payments, payments made in cash, and a gap in referrals while Reynolds was investigated in Harris County (then resumed referrals after charges dropped).
- Reynolds denied knowledge that Valdez solicited clients improperly, contending referrals came legitimately from clinics or walk-ins; he attacked Valdez’s credibility and argued improper admission of extraneous-offense evidence and incorrect venue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Reynolds) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Reynolds knowingly permitted improper solicitation | Circumstantial evidence (signed fee agreements dated within 31 days, Valdez's testimony, cash payments, coded texts, whited-out "Robert" entries, timing of medical visits, and gap during Harris County probe) shows Reynolds knew and permitted solicitation | Reynolds argued referrals came from clinics or walk-ins, Valdez lacked credibility, payments were for legitimate services, and no direct proof he knew Valdez used accident reports | Affirmed conviction: jury could reasonably infer Reynolds knew and permitted Valdez's improper solicitation; evidence legally sufficient under Jackson standard |
| Admission of extraneous-offense evidence (Castelan settlement and Harris County investigation) | Evidence was relevant to intent, knowledge, rebutting Reynolds's testimony, and showed pattern/knowledge; Harris County matter explained why Reynolds paused referrals | Reynolds argued unfairly prejudicial, not sufficiently similar, and some matters (e.g., alleged forgery, arrest) were improper | Court: admission of Castelan settlement details should have been excluded but error was harmless; Harris County evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) and 403 to rebut Reynolds's testimony and show knowledge; no abuse of discretion |
| Venue (trial in Montgomery County) | Venue proper because part of the solicitation activity (Valdez's operations and some transmissions of paperwork) originated in Montgomery County where Valdez lived and worked | Reynolds argued accused acts and clients were in Harris County; trial in Montgomery County prejudiced him because Harris County investigation evidence might not have been admissible there | Venue sustained by preponderance: sufficient circumstantial proof activity occurred in Montgomery County; even if erroneous, failure to prove venue was not harmful |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes legal-sufficiency standard for criminal convictions)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (applies Jackson standard in Texas criminal appeals)
- Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (jury is sole judge of witness credibility)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (circumstantial evidence may support conviction)
- Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (test for relevance and Rule 404(b) considerations)
- Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (factors for Rule 403 probative-prejudice balancing)