Ronald Eugene Reynolds v. State
08-15-00375-CR
| Tex. App. | Nov 29, 2017Background
- Ronald E. Reynolds (Appellant), a Houston attorney, was tried with others and convicted of five misdemeanor barratry counts for knowingly permitting a third party (Robert Valdez) to solicit accident victims within 31 days of accidents in order to obtain professional employment, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 38.12(d).
- Valdez and his ex-wife ran a scheme: obtain recent Houston accident reports, contact not-at-fault drivers, refer them to clinics and law firms, and receive cash referral payments; Valdez pleaded guilty and testified against lawyers, claiming Reynolds paid for referrals.
- Investigators found client files, signed fee agreements, intake questionnaires, and attorney forms under Reynolds’s letterhead in Valdez’s home and at Reynolds’s office; several clients’ paperwork showed contact within 30 days of the accidents.
- Reynolds denied knowledge that Valdez solicited clients improperly, argued referrals came legitimately from clinics or walk-ins, and attacked Valdez’s credibility; Reynolds testified he paid marketing/investigative fees to other vendors and had been investigated in Harris County previously.
- The jury convicted Reynolds on all five counts; he received concurrent one-year jail sentences and $4,000 fines; on appeal he challenged (1) legal sufficiency, (2) admission of extraneous-offense evidence, and (3) venue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Reynolds) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Reynolds knowingly permitted improper solicitation | Evidence (Valdez’s testimony, client files showing early contact, cash payments, coded texts, whited-out "Robert" entries, treatment dates, pause in referrals during Harris County probe) supports knowing permission | Reynolds: referrals came from legitimate clinic/walk-ins; Valdez untrustworthy; no direct proof Reynolds knew how Valdez obtained clients | Affirmed: circumstantial evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find Reynolds knowingly permitted solicitation |
| Admission of extraneous-offense evidence (Castelan settlement and Harris County investigation) | Evidence relevant to intent, knowledge, rebutting Reynolds’s testimony, and timeline; probative value outweighs prejudice | Reynolds: unfairly prejudicial, improper character evidence, and irrelevant (Harris County probe different scheme) | Castelan settlement evidence should have been excluded but error was harmless; Harris County evidence admissible for limited purpose (knowledge/credibility) and not an abuse of discretion |
| Venue (Montgomery County) | Venue proper: some solicitations originated from Valdez’s Montgomery County location (fax, hand-delivery), proved by preponderance | Reynolds: clients and his offices were in Harris County; Montgomery connection irrelevant; he lacked awareness of Montgomery role | Affirmed: venue proven by preponderance; if error, defendant showed no harm |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for legal sufficiency review: verdict must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (clarifies Jackson sufficiency standard in Texas review)
- Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (jury as sole judge of credibility; circumstantial evidence can support conviction)
- Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (factors for Rule 403 balancing and presumption favoring admissibility of relevant evidence)
- Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (framework for relevance and Rule 404(b) analysis)