Ronald Deere v. Vince Cullen, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11110

Deere killed Cindy Gleason’s brother-in-law Don Davis and Davis’s two young daughters after Cindy left him (Mar. 4, 1982).
Deere initially pled not guilty but moved to guilty plea; two mental-health experts (Bolger and Jones) found Deere oriented and not psychotic; both diagnosed severe personality/substance disorders.
Counsel Glenn Jones believed Deere competent and supported a guilty plea with death penalty; the court accepted a lucid, informed guilty plea after extensive colloquy.
In 1982 Judge Metheny sentenced Deere to death after a guilty plea; on remand (1986) the California Supreme Court required mitigating evidence but Deere again received a death sentence; later proceedings shifted to evaluating competency and mitigation.
Deere’s federal habeas petition (1993) challenged competency and counsel performance; district court granted relief on ineffective assistance for failing to request a plenary competency hearing; the Ninth Circuit initially remanded for an evidentiary hearing on competency; on remand the district court denied most claims; the panel reversed on the competency-to-plead-guilty issue and remanded for further proceedings.
The case discusses subsequent evaluations of Judge Metheny’s competence in 1986 and the effectiveness of counsel in seeking recusal, ultimately denying most habeas relief but reversing on the 1982 competency issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Competence to plead guilty in 1982	Deere argues counsel should have sought a plenary competency hearing.	State asserts no prejudice from lack of hearing given record showing competence.	No reasonable probability Deere would have been found incompetent; plea valid.
Competence of Judge Metheny in 1986 penalty retrial	Judge Metheny was mentally incompetent to preside the 1986 retrial.	Record shows impartiality and competence; no need for evidentiary hearing.	District court did not err in denying evidentiary hearing on Metheny’s competence.
Ineffective assistance for not seeking recusal based on Metheny’s competence	Jones should have sought Metheny’s recusal given incompetence evidence.	Recusal was not required; no prejudice shown.	Jones’s failure to seek recusal did not prejudice Deere.
IAC for not investigating Deere’s 1982 competency contemporaneously	Counsel failed to adequately develop Deere’s 1982 competency.	Record shows Deere understood proceedings and had rational reasons for pleading guilty.	Deere shown to have had rational understanding; IAC not established.
Post-remand evidentiary concerns about Metheny’s 1986 conduct	Retains possibility Metheny’s conduct reflected incompetence; warrants hearing.	Evidence shows occasional oddities but not constitutional incompetence; hearing unnecessary.	District court did not abuse discretion; no hearing required.

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (due-process concerns in competency determinations; mental state standard for competence to stand trial)
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (establishes framework for competence to stand trial)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (mental competence to plead guilty is not higher than to stand trial)
Dennis v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cir.2004) (retrospective mental-health opinions are disfavored; question is capacity to appreciate options and make rational choice)
Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.1986) (presumption of state-court competence; clear-and-convincing evidence required to rebut)
Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir.2004) (habeas standards; de novo review of competency determinations; evidentiary hearing considerations)
Maggiore v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam on competency presumption)