358 P.3d 464
Wash. Ct. App.2015Background
- Ronald Clipse, a commercial truck driver, accepted an at-will offer from Commercial Driver Services, Inc. (CDS) to be a driving instructor and quit his prior job in reliance on that offer.
- Before starting, CDS required a medical exam; the examiner initially issued a 30-day certificate after finding Clipse was taking prescribed methadone, then later issued a one-year certificate after receiving additional doctor documentation.
- CDS refused to hire Clipse after learning he took methadone, offering shifting reasons (failed physical, no-tolerance drug policy, requirement of a one- or two-year medical certificate); CDS had no written prohibition on prescription drugs in its Employee Guidelines.
- Clipse sued for disability discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), promissory estoppel, and sought double damages under RCW chapters 49.52 and 49.60; a jury found for Clipse on WLAD and promissory estoppel and awarded back pay and noneconomic damages.
- The trial court granted CDS judgment as a matter of law on the claim for double damages and struck Clipse’s late attorney-fee motion; it denied CDS’s JMOL on WLAD and promissory estoppel.
- On appeal, the court affirmed denial of JMOL on the WLAD claim, reversed denial of JMOL on promissory estoppel (finding insufficient evidence of a promise of permanent employment), affirmed JMOL on double damages (RCW 49.52), and affirmed striking the late fee motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Clipse) | Defendant's Argument (CDS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of double-damages (RCW 49.52) to WLAD back wages | Double damages should apply to the back wages awarded by the jury | RCW 49.52 double-damages apply only to wages the employer was already "obligated to pay" before verdict | Held: Double damages do not apply; retrospective WLAD damages are not preexisting "obligated" wages (affirmed JMOL for CDS) |
| Timeliness of attorney-fee motion and enlargement of time | Judgment’s "reserved" language excused or extended CR 54(d)(2) deadline; any lateness was excusable neglect | Motion was untimely under CR 54(d)(2); no excusable neglect shown for CR 6(b) enlargement | Held: Motion was untimely and denial of enlargement was not an abuse of discretion; strike motion affirmed |
| Sufficiency of evidence for WLAD (disability, qualification, accommodation/perceived disability) | Evidence that methadone’s side effects constituted an actual disability or that CDS perceived a disability; Clipse was qualified and entitled to accommodation | CDS argued Clipse was not disabled or qualified and no accommodation was required | Held: Sufficient evidence supported WLAD verdict (affirmed denial of JMOL on WLAD) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for promissory estoppel | The job offer and Clipse’s reliance (quitting prior job) established promissory estoppel | No clear, definite promise of permanent employment; position was at-will | Held: Insufficient evidence of a clear, definite promise of permanent employment; JMOL should have been granted for CDS on promissory estoppel (reversed verdict on that claim) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hemmings v. Tidyman's, Inc., 285 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2002) (retrospective WLAD-style damages are not wages an employer was previously "obligated" to pay for purposes of double damages)
- Allstot v. Edwards, 114 Wn. App. 625 (2002) (double damages applied where a stipulation created a preexisting obligation to pay specific back wages)
- Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158 (1994) (elements of promissory estoppel in employment context; for at-will employment, a clear definite promise of permanent employment is required)
- Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 149 Wn.2d 521 (2003) (standard for reviewing JMOL and substantial-evidence sufficiency)
- Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357 (1999) (WLAD construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose)
- Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 114 Wn. App. 80 (2002) (actual damages under WLAD may include back pay, front pay, and noneconomic damages)