Ronald Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports Incor
758 F.3d 841
7th Cir.2014Background
- Burzlaff bought a Thoroughbred Stallion motor trike for over $35,000 in 2009.
- Vehicle had numerous defects including nonstart, leaks, and alignment issues; required repairs.
- Repairs were performed at Amato Ford (a non-authorized Thoroughbred dealer) under Thoroughbred’s direction with parts paid by Thoroughbred.
- Vehicle was out of service for 71 days in the first year, triggering Wisconsin Lemon Law timing.
- Plaintiff pursued Wisconsin Lemon Law and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims; district court entered a large verdict under the Lemon Law with double damages plus fees.
- Thoroughbred appealed asserting errors in jury instructions, sufficiency of the Lemon Law evidence, and whether the Magnuson-Moss claim should have gone to the jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Federal jurisdiction over claims | Burzlaff alleges the Lemon Law claim supports diversity; removal jurisdiction proper. | Magnuson-Moss lacks sufficient amount in controversy; diversity alone insufficient because damages under Lemon Law were uncertain. | The district court had original diversity jurisdiction over Lemon Law and could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Magnuson-Moss. |
| Modification of Lemon Law jury instructions | District court properly adapted pattern instructions to reflect repair at Amato Ford and manufacturer’s involvement. | Modifications misstate notice/repair requirements and should track pattern language. | District court’s modified instructions were appropriate and accurate. |
| Sufficiency of Lemon Law evidence | Evidence showed repair facility acted on behalf of Thoroughbred; Amato Ford repairs were authorized in practice. | Burzlaff did not repair with an authorized dealer and thus may fail Lemon Law standards. | There was sufficient evidence for the Lemon Law verdict. |
| Submission of Magnuson-Moss claim to jury | Even if monetary relief under Magnuson-Moss was abandoned, jury should determine liability given overlap with Lemon Law. | Submitting the claim to a jury risks prejudice if weak. | Submitting Magnuson-Moss to the jury was not error or prejudicial; separate questions preserved clarity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 542 N.W.2d 148 (Wis. 1996) (remedial nature of Lemon Law; interpret liberally to aid consumers)
- Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 365 (Wis. 2004) (broad interpretation of Lemon Law protections)
- Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2004) (amount in controversy under Magnuson-Moss guidelines; limits on recovery)
- Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998) (detailing calculation of amount in controversy under Magnuson-Moss)
- Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank—Illinois, 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000) (equitable estoppel principles in statutory contexts)
- Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 536 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (separate verdict questions; respect for jury process to avoid confusion)
- Eastern Trading Co. v. Refco, Inc., 229 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2000) (prejudice standard for submitting claims to jury)
- Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (Supreme Court 2006) (case management and jury trial considerations)