919 F.3d 1038
8th Cir.2019Background
- Ronald Buckler was injured (quadriplegia) at a surface gravel mine when he reached into a rock crusher that was not de-energized after a vibrating chute jammed.
- MSHA conducted a regular inspection in March 2011; the accident occurred in June 2011. Post-accident citations included missing training documentation for Buckler and a violation for failing to de-energize/block equipment during maintenance.
- Buckler sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging MSHA inspector failures (inspection scope, failure to observe operations/maintenance, failure to review training records, and failure to disseminate safety information) contributed to his injury.
- The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing (1) no state-law private-analogue duty under Missouri law and (2) the FTCA discretionary-function exception barred liability.
- The district court dismissed for lack of a private-analogue duty and, alternatively, on discretionary-function grounds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed except as to the narrow claim that the inspector wholly failed to review training records.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri recognizes a private-analogue duty for negligent inspections (Good Samaritan-style duty) | Buckler: Missouri law (Brown) would impose liability where an inspector undertook to inspect and failed to report hazards, thereby increasing risk | U.S.: A negligent inspector only allows an existing private risk to persist and no private-analogue duty exists | Court: Found a qualifying state-law duty exists (Brown persuasive) — waiver prong satisfied |
| Whether MSHA inspection duties at issue are nondiscretionary (removing discretionary-function protection) | Buckler: Statutory/regulatory/handbook provisions create mandatory duties (dissemination, inspect equipment/observe all cycles, review training records) | U.S.: Inspectors retain operational discretion; handbook and statutes lack sufficiently specific mandatory directives | Court: Most duties involve judgment and are discretionary (no mandatory specificity), so discretionary-function applies to most claims |
| Whether inspectors' discretion is grounded in policy (so exception applies even if discretionary) | Buckler: Inspector discretion serves miner-safety alone and is technical, not policy-driven | U.S.: Field-level choices implicate resource, priority, and cost-safety tradeoffs — susceptible to policy analysis | Court: Inspector choices are susceptible to policy analysis (presumption applies) — discretionary-function bars most claims |
| Whether the jurisdictional inquiry requires fact development for alleged total failure to review training records | Buckler: Evidence (missing training records, inspector form entries, his own lack of training) shows inspector may have entirely failed to review; total failure is a non-discretionary omission and raises factual question | U.S.: Any review method is discretionary; inspector must only "review" in some manner | Held: Reversed and remanded as to the narrow claim that the inspector entirely failed to perform the mandatory/non-discretionary duty to review training records; that factual question requires further development. All other claims dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Herden v. United States, 726 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (FTCA discretionary-function framework and presumption that field discretion implicates policy)
- Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (two-step discretionary-function test; policy grounding requirement)
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (distinguishing mandatory directives from discretionary conduct under FTCA)
- Appley Bros. v. United States, 164 F.3d 1164 (8th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing discretion in method of investigation from mandatory duty to investigate at least in some fashion)
- Varig Airlines v. United States, 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (decisions about regulatory enforcement priorities implicate feasibility/practicality and policy)
- Metter v. United States, 785 F.3d 1227 (8th Cir. 2015) (interpretation of mandatory language and assessment of discretion in safety-related agency guidance)
- Eubank v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 626 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2010) (predicting Missouri Supreme Court rule based on intermediate appellate decisions)