Romero v. Lovelace Health Systems, A-1-CA-35177

Background

Plaintiff Marlina Romero alleged medical negligence and vicarious liability arising from administration of methotrexate after surgery at Lovelace, causing termination of pregnancy on June 23, 2011.
Plaintiff filed an application with the New Mexico Medical Review Commission (MMA Commission) on May 14, 2014 and later sued Lovelace and other providers on October 17, 2014.
Lovelace is a non‑qualified provider under the MMA; non‑qualified providers are subject to the three‑year statute of limitations in NMSA 1978, § 37‑1‑8.
Lovelace moved to dismiss as time‑barred; in its reply it attached Plaintiff’s MMA application showing Lovelace was referenced in factual narrative but not listed in the “individuals involved” section.
The district court converted the motion to summary judgment (after giving Plaintiff leave to file a surreply), held that tolling under the MMA may apply to non‑qualified providers but only if they are ‘‘named’’ in the application, and found Lovelace was not adequately named; it granted summary judgment for Lovelace.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the MMA tolling provision did not apply to Lovelace because the application failed to identify alleged acts of malpractice or vicarious liability against Lovelace sufficient to put it on notice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by converting Lovelace’s Rule 1‑012 motion to summary judgment without adequate notice and thereby prejudicing Romero	Conversion lacked formal notice (no numbered facts) and limited Romero's opportunity to preserve issues	Court warned parties it would convert and gave Romero 23 days to file a surreply; extrinsic materials were in the record long before the hearing	No error: conversion was proper because Romero had reasonable notice and opportunity to respond and failed to show prejudice
Whether Romero’s MMA application tolled the statute of limitations as to non‑qualified provider Lovelace	The application referenced Lovelace in the factual narrative and releases; that suffices to ‘‘name’’ Lovelace and trigger tolling under Grantland	The application did not list Lovelace in the providers section nor allege malpractice or respondeat superior against Lovelace; the Commission’s letters show it did not view Lovelace as involved	Tolling did not apply: a plaintiff must identify a particular provider and alleged acts of malpractice to toll the limitations period as to that provider
Whether Romero could rely on broader notice‑pleading principles (or amend later) to preserve tolling	MMA applications need not include every theory; amending or later adding providers should be permitted; court pleadings standards support notice pleading	Allowing later substitution would grant plaintiffs extra time beyond statutory limits and defeat the statute’s protective notice function	Rejected: MMA’s structure and purpose require that providers to be tolled be identified in the application so defendants receive notice; permitting later substitution would subvert limitations policy

Key Cases Cited

Grantland v. Lea Regional Hospital, Inc., 796 P.2d 599 (N.M. 1990) (MMA tolling provision applies even if Commission later determines provider is non‑qualified when claimant made good‑faith submission)
Meza v. Topalovski, 268 P.3d 1284 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (tolling under MMA as to one provider does not toll limitations as to a different provider not named in original application)
Peck v. Title USA Ins. Corp., 766 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1988) (when extrinsic materials are before court and parties have notice, a Rule 12 motion may be treated as summary judgment)
Ennis v. Kmart Corp., 33 P.3d 32 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (conversion to summary judgment is permissible where opposing party had reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence)
Trujillo v. Puro, 683 P.2d 963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (not all counts/ allegations must be presented to the Commission in an MMA application)