Romero v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 455 P.3d 851

Plaintiff underwent treatment at facilities operated by Lovelace in June 2011; physicians diagnosed a presumed ectopic pregnancy, performed laparoscopy, and administered methotrexate without obtaining informed consent; a later ultrasound showed an intrauterine pregnancy and the pregnancy was aborted.
Plaintiff submitted an MRC application describing dates, events, treating physicians, and the Lovelace facilities where care occurred; the application listed individual providers by name but did not list Lovelace (the corporate entity) among the "providers whose care may be germane."
One medical release in the MRC materials authorized release of records from multiple Lovelace hospitals to the MRC.
Lovelace is a nonqualified provider under the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA); the parties agreed that an MRC application can toll the limitations period as to nonqualified providers if the provider is named in the application.
The district court treated Lovelace’s dismissal motion as summary judgment and held the MRC application did not "name" Lovelace or allege acts by Lovelace sufficient to toll the three-year limitations period; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the MRC application’s specific factual allegations about personnel and care at Lovelace hospitals were sufficient to name Lovelace for tolling purposes and to raise vicarious-liability notice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the MRC application tolled the 3-year limitations period as to nonqualified Lovelace	Romero: The MRC application described facts, named treating clinicians and Lovelace facilities, and thus tolled the limitations period	Lovelace: The application failed to "name" Lovelace or allege specific acts by Lovelace or its agents, so tolling did not apply	Held: The Court reversed — describing wrongful acts by named employees at identified Lovelace hospitals sufficiently named Lovelace and tolled the limitations period
Whether the MMA requires an express, heightened naming of a corporate provider (or explicit vicarious-liability allegation) in the MRC application	Romero: No heightened pleading; notice-pleading principles apply and vicarious liability may be inferred from factual allegations about agents/employees	Lovelace: The statute’s plain requirement to "name" providers requires explicit identification, especially when asserting respondeat superior	Held: The Court rejected a heightened standard; factual detail about agents and the hospitals put Lovelace on notice consistent with Zamora/Baer

Grantland v. Lea Regional Hosp., 796 P.2d 599 (N.M. 1990) (MRC application tolls statute of limitations as to nonqualified providers)
Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 918 P.2d 1321 (N.M. 1996) (explaining occurrence-based repose for qualified providers and discovery rule for nonqualified providers)
Zamora v. St. Vincent Hosp., 335 P.3d 1243 (N.M. 2014) (notice-pleading sufficiency — factual allegations can give adequate notice of vicarious-liability claims)
Baer v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 884 P.2d 841 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (pleading that "medical personnel" were negligent sufficed to give defendant notice of vicarious-liability theory)
Cahn v. Berryman, 408 P.3d 1012 (N.M. 2018) (summary judgment standard; courts construe facts in favor of nonmoving party)