Romer v. State
293 Ga. 339
| Ga. | 2013Background
- Appellant Romer was convicted in Fulton County of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and related firearm offenses for the February 13, 2006 shooting death of 16-year-old Quantavia Hill.
- The prosecution presented eyewitness and physical evidence showing Romer chased Hill and fired at him as he ran from the house; five shell casings were recovered at the scene.
- The defense acknowledged Romer fired the gun outside the house but argued self-defense against Kennedy and Hendricks, with no corroborating shootout evidence.
- Jamal Romer, Romer’s brother, testified to a version favorable to Romer; Jamal had previously refused to give a police statement after the shooting.
- On the day after the shooting, Jamal declined to speak to police; the State cross-examined him about that silence, and Romer later attempted to exclude such questions as a Fifth Amendment issue.
- Romer claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, including how impeachment of witnesses was handled and whether certain cross-examination questions should have been pursued.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the evidence suffices to sustain the murder convictions | Romer | ||
| insights to show lack of motive and inconsistent testimony | Romer argues insufficient evidence and motive not proven | Yes; evidence viewed in the light most favorable supports guilt | |
| Whether the trial court erred by denying pretrial and trial questions about Jamal’s silence | Romer claims Jamal’s silence was protected by Fifth Amendment and should be excluded | State argues defendant lacks standing to enforce another’s rights and Mallory rule insufficient to bar such questioning | Movements denied; Mallory rule not extended to witnesses other than defendant; no reversible error |
| Whether Romer received ineffective assistance of counsel | Romer asserts deficient performance by trial counsel in impeachment strategy | State contends counsel acted within professional norms | No deficient performance shown; no prejudice established |
| Whether trial counsel should have cross-examined Kennedy/Hendricks about charges to show bias | Cross-exam about pending charges could reveal bias | Charges had limited probative value and tactical concerns warranted restraint | Counsel’s decisions not deficient; tactical choice within reasonable professional limits |
| Whether Mallory’s silence rule applies under current evidence framework | Mallory prohibits comment on silence in criminal cases | Mallory no longer applies under current code and does not govern witness silence | Mallory limited; not extended to non-defendant witnesses; preserved issue not raised |
Key Cases Cited
- Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32 (Ga. 2009) (credibility and motive considerations for evidence)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (sufficiency of evidence standard for criminal convictions)
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (U.S. 1976) (prohibition on引用 silence used to incriminate after Miranda warnings)
- Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625 (Ga. 1991) (comment on silence may be highly prejudicial; limits on postarrest silence evidence)
- Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70 (Ga. 2009) (cited in context of impeachment and witness credibility)
- Grissom v. State, 300 Ga. App. 593 (Ga. App. 2009) (impeachment strategies and evidence rules)
- Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (U.S. 1982) (Miranda-related cross-examination considerations)
- Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (U.S. 1980) (policy on silences and probative value of silence)
- Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902 (Ga. 2011) (deficient performance reviewed under Strickland standard)