274 A.3d 451
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2022Background
- Romeka was Chief Radiation Therapist employed by RadAmerica at Mercy’s Radiation Oncology Center; multiple coworkers and physicians complained about her competency, conduct, and a falsified patient consent entry.
- Internal RadAmerica supervisors (May 1–10) and MedStar HR (May 14–16) investigated and recommended termination based on falsification, safety concerns, and interpersonal problems.
- On May 17 Romeka orally complained to her supervisor (Osik) that the TrueBeam treatment couch motor was broken and that SRS treatments had proceeded with manual couch rotation; she did not file a written grievance.
- RadAmerica’s President (Spearman) made the final termination decision no later than May 18; Romeka was formally terminated on May 21 and asked (after being told she was fired) to be allowed to resign instead.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for RadAmerica, finding Romeka could not show causation (that the protected disclosure caused the firing) and that refusing to accept a resignation after termination is not an HCWWPA personnel action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causation standard under the HCWWPA | Romeka: a "motivating factor" (less than but‑for) suffices; close temporal proximity (1 day) and date discrepancies show pretext. | RadAmerica: HCWWPA requires employer acted "because of" disclosure (but‑for); decision to fire preceded or was independent of disclosure; proffered reasons legitimate. | Court held HCWWPA retaliation requires but‑for causation in the ultimate pretext inquiry (McDonnell Douglas framework applies; Nassar and Foster persuasive). Romeka failed to show pretext or but‑for causation on summary judgment. |
| Refusal to allow resignation after firing as a HCWWPA personnel action | Romeka: refusing to accept resignation is a personnel action and denial here was retaliatory. | RadAmerica: she was already terminated, so no employment relationship when she requested resignation; refusal is not an actionable personnel action. | Court held refusal to permit resignation after termination is not actionable under HCWWPA because employment had ended and claim would be inconsistent with affirming the termination’s legitimacy. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (established the burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial employment retaliation claims)
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (retaliation claims require but‑for causation)
- Foster v. Univ. of Maryland‑Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying McDonnell Douglas in retaliation context and explaining pretext stage equates to but‑for causation)
- Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215 (Md. 2010) (interpreting HCWWPA purpose and scope)
- Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Maryland, Inc., 183 Md. App. 211 (app. 2008) (discussing motivating‑factor language in Maryland retaliation context)
- Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Maryland, Inc. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594 (Md. 2011) (affirming Gasper on motivating‑factor discussion)
- Department of Natural Resources v. Heller, 391 Md. 148 (Md. 2006) (discussing elements and burden shifting for Maryland whistleblower statute)
- Doe v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Md. 2017) (holding an employment relationship must exist for HCWWPA personnel‑action coverage)