431 P.3d 242
Idaho2018Background
- Rome was convicted of aiding and abetting burglary after a woman took a vacuum from Walmart and entered his truck; jury also found him a persistent violator based on prior felonies.
- He filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel (multiple grounds), later amended with counsel.
- At the post-conviction bench trial Rome called his trial/appellate counsel and his partner; after Rome rested the State moved for involuntary dismissal and the court granted it.
- Rome argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by (1) refusing to take judicial notice of various records/transcripts and (2) finding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request an accessory-after-the-fact lesser-included instruction.
- The district court ruled Rome’s judicial-notice requests were overbroad/unspecific under former I.R.E. 201(d) and held accessory-after-the-fact is not a lesser-included offense of aiding-and-abetting under the statutory theory; it also noted Rome’s appellate record was insufficient to show the pleading theory was met.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to take judicial notice of various prior records/transcripts | Rome: He submitted requests for judicial notice of trial transcript, appellate briefs, prior conviction records, clerk’s record, and other files and contends the court should have noticed them | State: Requests were overbroad, vague, and failed to identify specific adjudicative facts or portions of records as required by former I.R.E. 201(d) | Court: No abuse of discretion; requests were fatally unspecific/overbroad and did not supply the necessary information for judicial notice under former Rule 201(d) |
| Whether trial counsel’s failure to request an accessory-after-the-fact lesser-included instruction constituted ineffective assistance under Strickland | Rome: Counsel later said he could have requested that instruction; accessory-after-the-fact is a means of aiding-and-abetting and thus a lesser-included offense, so failure to request was deficient | State: Accessory-after-the-fact is a separate offense with elements not subsumed by aiding-and-abetting; requesting it could expose defendant to additional liability; Rome also failed to supply charging documents to support a pleading-theory claim | Court: Affirmed—accessory-after-the-fact is not a lesser-included offense under the statutory theory; the record was insufficient to show the pleading theory was met, so no error in denying relief |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Rome, 160 Idaho 40 (Ct. App. 2016) (direct-appeal decision upholding conviction)
- Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs, LLC v. Franklin Cnty., 157 Idaho 424 (Idaho 2014) (bench-trial involuntary dismissal standard)
- Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (Idaho 2010) (requirement of particularity for judicial-notice requests)
- Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437 (Ct. App. 2016) (denial of blanket judicial-notice requests for lack of specificity)
- State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971 (Idaho 2015) (definition and use of adjudicative facts for judicial notice)
- State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1 (Idaho 2016) (statutory theory for lesser-included offenses)
- State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522 (Idaho 1997) (pleading and statutory theories for lesser-included offenses)
- State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344 (Idaho 1988) (distinction between accessory after the fact and accomplice liability)
- State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445 (Idaho 2012) (mens rea required for accomplice/aiding-and-abetting liability)
