Roman Catholic Diocese v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretar
793 F.3d 449
5th Cir.2015Background
- Religious nonprofits and dioceses challenged the ACA contraceptive-coverage mandate and the regulatory "accommodation" that lets eligible religious organizations opt out by certifying objection and notifying insurers or HHS (via EBSA Form 700 or an HHS notice).
- Plaintiffs sincerely believe that certain contraceptives (e.g., some emergency contraceptives and IUDs) cause abortions and that facilitating access violates their faith; some plaintiffs are automatically exempt (church plans), others are eligible for the accommodation.
- The accommodation directs insurers/TPAs to provide contraceptive payments separately from the employer’s plan, forbids charging or passing costs to the employer, and requires a notice to plan participants.
- District courts enjoined enforcement for these plaintiffs (final or preliminary injunctions in various Texas districts); appeals were consolidated in the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit framed the dispute under RFRA’s substantial-burden inquiry: whether the regulations "substantially burden" religious exercise (if so, strict scrutiny applies).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the accommodation or filing Form 700/notice substantially burdens plaintiffs’ religious exercise under RFRA | Filing triggers, authorizes, or facilitates third-party provision of contraceptives and thus makes plaintiffs complicit | The contraceptive coverage duty arises from federal law on insurers/TPAs independent of plaintiffs’ filings; filing only enables the exemption process | Filing or notice does not substantially burden plaintiffs; acts that offend beliefs are third-party conduct and not attributable to plaintiffs |
| Whether required contracts with insurers/TPAs amount to facilitating contraceptive use | Entering contracts enables insurers/TPAs to provide contraceptives, so contracts facilitate objectionable conduct | Contracts cover non-objectionable services; the government compels insurers/TPAs to provide contraceptives separately; plaintiffs do not contractually authorize contraceptive coverage | Contracts do not force plaintiffs to provide or facilitate contraceptives; no substantial burden shown |
| Whether the accommodation uses plaintiffs’ plans as vehicles for contraceptive payments | The accommodation still routes payments through or uses plaintiffs’ plans as the mechanism | Regulations prohibit including contraceptive coverage in plans and require separate payments and participant notices; payments are independent | The accommodation does not use the plans as vehicles; insurers/TPAs provide separate payments |
| Ripeness of claim that TPAs will pass costs to self-insured plaintiffs despite reimbursement | Plaintiffs predict TPAs will attempt to charge them and reimbursement may be insufficient | This is speculative; no TPAs have demanded payment; issues require factual development and are not ripe | Claim not ripe; court declines to decide potential future disputes |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (court decides whether government action pressures religious exercise; limits Free Exercise reach)
- Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (government management of its property does not necessarily impose a constitutional free-exercise burden)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (RFRA substantial-burden framework applied; deference to sincerity on defining religious exercise; court assesses penalties)
- Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir.) (court accepts sincerity but independently decides whether law substantially burdens religious exercise)
- Geneva Coll. v. Secretary, 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.) (accommodation does not make eligible organizations complicit; court may assess substantial burden)
- Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir.) (similar holding that accommodation shifts responsibility to insurers/TPAs and does not substantially burden objectors)