Roma Independent School District (Appellant/Cross-Appellee) v. Ewing Construction Company (Appellee/Cross-Appellant), Cab-Cos Contractors, L.L.C., Sechrist-Hall Company, Padron Plumbing, Inc., 04-12-00035-CV

Roma ISD contracted Ewing for middle school construction; Ewing sued for breach of contract for extra work, delays, and retainage.
Roma filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing immunity from suit; trial court held immunity waived for breach.
Ewing cross-appealed on promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, but those claims were dropped in the live pleading.
The court analyzes immunity under Texas Local Government Code § 271.152 for breach of contract against a local governmental entity.
Evidence showed extensive communications about delays and additional work, creating fact issues about breach and waiver, including district representatives’ deposition exhibits.
Section 271.153 was argued as a basis to limit liability; the court holds it is not a proper basis to grant a plea to the jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Waiver of immunity for breach under 271.152	Ewing alleges a written contract and waiver of immunity for breach.	Roma contends no waiver due to contract procedures and notices.	Waiver exists; fact issues preclude dismissal on jurisdiction.
271.153 as a basis to deny jurisdiction	Kirby Lake support liability limits; argues 271.153 governs damages not jurisdiction.	District asserts 271.153 bars liability and jurisdiction.	271.153 is not a proper basis to grant a plea to the jurisdiction.
Impact of notice and waiver evidence on contract claim	Evidence shows waiver of contract procedures through conduct and notices.	Waiver arguments are insufficient to defeat immunity at the jurisdictional stage.	Fact issues exist regarding waiver and breach; cannot grant plea to jurisdiction.

City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2011) (immunity from suit is jurisdictional)
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (plea to jurisdiction standard; liberal pleadings)
Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (pleadings liberally construed; intent of pleader)
Guzman v. Ugly Duckling Car Sales of Tex., L.L.P., 63 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001) (waiver is a question of fact; intent matters)
Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010) (purpose of 271.153 is to limit liability after liability established)
City of San Antonio v. KGME, Inc., 340 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011) (271.152 waiver and 271.153 limitations discussed)
City of Mesquite v. PKG Contracting, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (two-step approach to immunity and liability)
Judson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. ABC/Associated Benefit Consultants, Inc., 244 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008) (addressed 271.152/271.153 interplay pre-Reata context)
City of Houston v. Southern Elec. Servs., Inc., 273 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) (waiver scope and jurisdictional reach)