6 F.4th 633
5th Cir.2021Background
- Manning Rollerson, an African‑American property owner in Freeport’s East End (a historically segregated neighborhood), alleges the Port Freeport has been acquiring and depressing property values to expand the adjacent Velasco Container Terminal.
- By March 2019 the Port owned a large portion of East End lots; Rollerson alleges coercive tactics (threats of condemnation, false liens, withholding appraisals), demolition of acquired properties, and city coordination (denial of building permits) to force sales.
- The Port has cooperated with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the Freeport Harbor Channel Improvement Project; Rollerson alleges the Port benefitted from federal funding (Corps funds >$48M).
- Rollerson filed an administrative Title VI complaint (Nov. 2017); the Corps denied jurisdiction (Feb. 13, 2019) concluding the navigation program was not “Federal financial assistance” under Title VI.
- Rollerson sued the Port under §601 (Title VI) for intentional discrimination and sued the Corps under the APA for denying his administrative complaint; the district court dismissed both claims and Rollerson appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rollerson pleaded intentional discrimination under §601 of Title VI | Port’s land‑acquisition tactics, Freeport’s history of segregation, procedural departures, and city coordination show discriminatory intent supporting an Arlington Heights claim | Expansion is driven by legitimate, race‑neutral needs (geography/channel project); allegations do not plausibly show intent | Court affirmed dismissal: complaint fails to plausibly allege intentional discrimination under §601 |
| Whether Corps’s denial of the administrative complaint is reviewable under the APA §704 (adequate alternative remedy) | Private §601 suits cannot remedy disparate‑impact harms that only agencies can enforce under §602 post‑Sandoval; therefore APA review is necessary | A private suit against the funding recipient is an adequate alternative remedy, so APA review is barred | Reversed: private §601 action is not an adequate alternative for agency non‑enforcement of disparate‑impact regulations; §704 does not bar APA review |
| Whether the Corps’s denial is committed to agency discretion under APA §701(a)(2) / Heckler v. Chaney | Corps denied solely on legal/jurisdictional ground (no federal financial assistance), which is a legal question reviewable by courts | Decisions not to enforce are presumptively unreviewable prosecutorial discretion | Reversed: Heckler presumption does not apply where agency declines enforcement solely on a legal/jurisdictional ground; Corps’s denial is reviewable limited to whether federal financial assistance existed |
Key Cases Cited
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (framework and factors for inferring discriminatory intent)
- Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (no private right to enforce disparate‑impact regulations under §602)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (agency refusal to enforce presumptively unreviewable; exception where refusal is based solely on belief of lack of jurisdiction)
- Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993) (§704 reflects Congress’s intent to avoid duplicating special statutory review procedures)
- Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988) (limits on APA review and purpose of §704)
- Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (equates the prohibition in §601 with the Equal Protection standard requiring intentional discrimination)
- Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (application of Arlington Heights factors in the Fifth Circuit)
- Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2000) (limits on programmatic APA challenges)
- Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (private Title VI suit against recipient can preclude APA review of agency nonenforcement)
- Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 846 F.3d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (standards on what constitutes an adequate alternative remedy under §704)