Rolando Serna v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka, e
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20453
| 5th Cir. | 2013Background
- Serna defaulted on an online promissory note; Samara Portfolio Management acquired the loan and sought collection.
- Onwuteaka (attorney) filed a debt-collection suit in Harris County Justice of the Peace Court on July 6, 2010; Serna was served August 14, 2010 and a default judgment was obtained.
- Serna sued defendants in federal court under the FDCPA § 1692i(a)(2) (venue requirement) on August 12, 2011 (IFP filed), IFP denied August 15, 2011, and he refiled with fee August 18, 2011.
- The magistrate granted summary judgment for defendants, holding Serna’s FDCPA claim untimely because the limitations period began when the debt-collection suit was filed (July 6, 2010).
- The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding the relevant FDCPA violation (§ 1692i(a)(2)) occurs only after the debtor receives notice of the suit (service), so Serna’s August 18, 2011 filing was timely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does a § 1692i(a)(2) violation "occur" for § 1692k(d)'s one-year period? | Violation occurs only after filing and service — i.e., when debtor receives notice and must respond (service date). | Violation occurs at filing of the improper-venue suit; limitations runs from filing date. | Violation occurs when the debtor receives notice (service); limitations did not bar Serna. |
| Does "bring such action" plainly mean "file"? | Term ambiguous; remedial purpose of FDCPA favors tying to notice/harm. | "Bring" has ordinary federal meaning equivalent to commence/file. | Phrase ambiguous here; context and remedial purpose require notice-triggered violation. |
| Would holding filing triggers limitations encourage abuse? | Yes — allowing filing to trigger would let collectors delay service and evade the one-year window. | N/A (defendants relied on plain-language meaning). | Court agreed that tying trigger to service better protects consumers and prevents perverse incentives. |
| Is Serna's second filing (Aug 18, 2011) within the one-year period if service was Aug 14, 2010? | Yes — the one-year period runs from service; Rule 6(d) added three days after denial of IFP, making Aug 18 timely. | No — if limitations ran from filing (July 6) or if the date-of-violation exclusion applies differently, suit would be untimely. | Court concluded timely: violation date = service (Aug 14, 2010); Serna’s August 18 refile was within the one-year period when accounting for Rule 6(d). |
Key Cases Cited
- Gen. Universal Sys. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444 (5th Cir.) (summary judgment de novo standard)
- Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.) (claim accrual tied to actual injury)
- Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir.) (statute of limitations for FDCPA suit arising from suit runs from service)
- Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000) (textualist starting point for statutory interpretation)
- I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (presumption that Congress’s word choices matter)