Rojas-Cifuentes v. Am. Modular Systems CA3
C088775
Cal. Ct. App.Sep 16, 2021Background
- AMS (American Modular Systems) manufactures modular classrooms in Manteca and installs them at school sites statewide; shop shifts are scheduled 6:00 a.m.–2:30 p.m. with a short ‘‘grace period’’ allowing employees to punch in a few minutes early but prohibiting work before the bell.
- Rojas worked for AMS briefly in 2014 and sued in 2015 asserting multiple class claims and a PAGA claim; he sought class certification for three claims at issue on appeal: (1) prevailing-wage liability for travel time to public-works sites, (2) unpaid wages based on punch-card time due to AMS’s grace-period pay practice, and (3) untimely meal periods caused by early punches.
- The trial court denied certification of all three classes, finding individualized issues predominated—notably concluding (as a matter of law) that travel time was not compensable unless employees were required to use company vehicles.
- Rojas appealed; the Court of Appeal reviewed class-certification standards (Brinker framework) and the trial court’s reliance on individualized inquiries and certain legal assumptions.
- The Court of Appeal reversed in part: it found the trial court misstated the law on travel-time compensation for temporary/distant assignments and remanded the prevailing-wage class for further proceedings; it affirmed the denial of class certification for the unpaid-wage (timecard) and meal-period classes.
- The remand was limited to reconsideration of the prevailing-wage travel-time class in light of applicable federal guidance and DLSE/DIR interpretations; parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prevailing-wage travel time (class) | Travel time to public-works sites is compensable at prevailing wage; AMS failed to pay prevailing wage for travel to distant sites | Travel time is not compensable as a matter of law unless employees are required by contract to travel in company vehicles; contracts vary so individualized issues predominate | Trial court erred to the extent it held travel time noncompensable ‘‘as a matter of law’’; federal law and DLSE guidance show travel for temporary/distant assignments can be compensable. Reversed and remanded for reconsideration of class certification on this claim |
| Unpaid wages based on punch cards (class) | Employees are ‘‘on the clock’’ once they punch in, so pay should be based on punch times rather than scheduled times | AMS’s policy prohibits work during the grace period; many employees testified they did not work before the bell; must resolve individualized facts about whether employees actually worked | Denial of class certification affirmed. Court found Troester does not mandate that punch times automatically equal compensable work time; predominance problems remain |
| Meal-period violations (class) | Early punching causes meal periods to fall after five hours, creating a class-wide violation | Whether an employee actually worked during the early punch period is fact-specific; evidence shows variability and individualized inquiries are required | Denial of class certification affirmed. The meal-period claim ‘‘rises and falls’’ with the unpaid-wage/timecard theory and suffers the same predominance issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (Cal. 2012) (class-certification standards and community-of-interest rules)
- Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575 (Cal. 2000) (employer control test for compensable travel time)
- Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal.App.4th 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (shuttle/commute time not compensable when employee choice removes employer control)
- Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 5 Cal.5th 829 (Cal. 2018) (de minimis/off-the-clock work principles; punch times not dispositive)
- Silva v. See’s Candy Shops, Inc., 7 Cal.App.5th 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (grace-period policy: prohibiting work during grace period can support noncompensable status where employer exercised no control)
- Frlekin v. Apple Inc., 8 Cal.5th 1038 (Cal. 2020) (commuting generally not part of a day’s work)
- Imada v. City of Hercules, 138 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1998) (FLSA: ordinary home-to-work travel not compensable)
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (U.S. 1946) (time necessarily spent walking to workstations after clocking can be compensable)
