Rohrmoos Venture, Eric Langford, Dan Basso, and Tobin Grove v. Utsw DVA Healthcare, Llp, 578 S.W.3d 469

Background

Landlord Rohrmoos leased a commercial building to UTSW for a dialysis clinic; water intrusion and loose tiles led to regulatory citations and persistent moisture problems.
UTSW vacated and terminated the lease, then sued for breach of contract and breach of the implied warranty of suitability; Rohrmoos counterclaimed for unpaid rent (~$250,000).
A jury found both parties breached the lease, that Rohrmoos breached first, and that Rohrmoos breached the Davidow implied warranty of suitability; no compensatory damages were awarded to UTSW.
Trial court entered judgment allowing UTSW to terminate the lease and awarded attorney’s fees based on the lease’s prevailing-party clause: $800,000 (trial), $150,000 (court of appeals), $75,000 (Supreme Court) — total $1,025,000.
Rohrmoos appealed, arguing (1) under Davidow a tenant may only terminate for breach of the implied warranty of suitability (not for prior material breach of contract), and (2) the attorney’s-fee award lacked legally sufficient proof (no lodestar showing or billing records).
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed that termination is available for landlord’s prior material breach (and that Davidow is not inconsistent), but reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fee award because the proof did not establish a lodestar (hours × reasonable rate) or supporting detail.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a tenant may terminate a commercial lease for landlord's prior material breach	UTSW: A prior material breach by landlord can justify termination; jury found landlord breached first	Rohrmoos: Davidow limits termination remedy to breach of implied warranty of suitability only; material breach of express lease duties cannot justify termination	Court: Tenant may terminate for landlord's prior material breach; holding consistent with Davidow (which recognizes an independent implied warranty but does not bar termination for material breach)
Preservation of Davidow argument on appeal	Rohrmoos: Issue preserved by trial motions and briefing	UTSW: Rohrmoos failed to object to jury charge and did not preserve the point	Court: Davidow issue preserved — raised in trial brief, at trial, and in post-judgment motion; also a legal question for the court
Whether UTSW was a "prevailing party" entitled to fees under lease's prevailing-party clause	UTSW: As successful counter-defendant (take-nothing judgment on landlord’s counterclaim), it materially altered legal relationship and prevailed	Rohrmoos: Prevailing-party standard should mirror Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001 and KB Home — requiring recovery of damages	Court: A defendant can be a prevailing party; UTSW prevailed as counter-defendant and is entitled to fees under the contract clause (KB Home not controlling because contract defined a different standard)
Sufficiency of evidence supporting attorney’s-fee award	UTSW: Attorney’s testimony about experience, total hours, and reasonableness suffices under Arthur Andersen	Rohrmoos: Testimony was conclusory; lacked lodestar proof (documented hours × rates) and billing records; award unsupported	Court: Rejected fee proof as legally insufficient—fee claimant must prove reasonable hours × reasonable rate (lodestar) with particulars; Howard’s general testimony failed to meet El Apple/El Apple progeny standard; remand for redetermination

Key Cases Cited

Davidow v. Inwood North Professional Group–Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988) (recognizes implied warranty of suitability in commercial leases)
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012) (adopts lodestar approach and requires proof of reasonable hours and rates; remands when proof is conclusory)
Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star LP, 295 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009) (defines prevailing-party standard under certain contracts and Chapter 38 analysis)
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997) (sets nonexclusive factors for evaluating reasonableness of attorney’s fees)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1983) (lodestar: hours reasonably expended × reasonable hourly rate as starting point)
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (U.S. 1984) (lodestar presumed reasonable; limits on upward adjustments)
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (U.S. 2010) (confirms lodestar virtues and that enhancements require specific evidence)
City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. 2013) (applies El Apple lodestar principles outside TCHRA; rejects conclusory fee testimony)
Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014) (reaffirms need for task-specific time evidence to support lodestar)