40 F.4th 625
D.C. Cir.2022Background:
- Rohan Ramsingh, an Army veteran, went to Tampa International Airport on Nov. 23, 2019 to pick up his children and entered the TSA checkpoint.
- Ramsingh opted out of AIT screening due to a shoulder injury; TSA performed an explosive-trace hand swab that tested positive.
- TSA required a full-body pat-down; Ramsingh refused, citing PTSD and Military Sexual Trauma; TSA offered a private pat-down but he continued to refuse and said he would leave.
- Law enforcement peacefully escorted Ramsingh away after about 20 minutes; TSA assessed a civil penalty for "interfering" with screening personnel under 49 C.F.R. § 1540.109.
- An ALJ upheld liability but mitigated the fine to $680; TSA affirmed and Ramsingh petitioned for review in this court.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether refusing to complete required screening (a pat-down) constitutes "interfere" under 49 C.F.R. § 1540.109 | Ramsingh: passive noncompliance or inability to submit to pat-down does not "interfere." | TSA: refusal prevented screeners from resolving explosives alarm and completing duties; interference includes hindering or impeding screening. | Court: Held TSA reasonably concluded Ramsingh interfered; refusal objectively hindered screening. |
| Whether the regulation requires specific intent (mens rea) | Ramsingh: Section 1540.109 requires intentional mens rea. | TSA: regulation is a public-welfare rule imposing civil penalties; no specific intent required. | Court: Held no specific intent necessary; general intent (volitional refusal) suffices. |
| Vagueness (as-applied) challenge | Ramsingh: regulation is vague as applied; unclear what conduct constitutes "interference." | TSA: regulations and posted guidance give fair notice that failing to comply with required screening can be interference. | Court: Rejected as-applied vagueness challenge; Ramsingh's conduct was clearly proscribed. |
| Whether medical inability (PTSD/MST) negates volitional act or violates substantive due process | Ramsingh: his medical condition made noncompliance non-volitional; fining him shocks the conscience. | TSA: he voluntarily chose to refuse after alternatives; officers accommodated him in part and acted in good faith. | Court: Found Ramsingh made a volitional choice to refuse; fine did not violate substantive due process. |
Key Cases Cited
- Corbett v. TSA, 19 F.4th 478 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (discussing TSA's broad authority over aviation security)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (when to defer to agency interpretation of regulations)
- United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (permitting screening to continue once begun; safety rationale)
- Rendon v. TSA, 424 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2005) (interpreting § 1540.109 to cover conduct that actually hinders screening)
- District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950) (limits on construing "interfere" in home-inspection context)
- United States v. Willfong, 274 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting Little analogy when party affirmatively refused an officer's order)
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (public-welfare offenses and intent considerations)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (mens rea considerations in criminal statutes; silence is not dispositive)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (greater vagueness tolerance for civil/regulatory enactments)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (standard for substantive due process "shocks the conscience")
- United States v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (vagueness and statutory interpretation principles)