Rogers v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
214 F. Supp. 3d 10
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Charles H. Rogers, Jr. was hired by WMATA as a bus driver in March 2010 and later terminated in May 2013 for operating with a suspended Maryland CDL, having multiple open motor-vehicle cases and upcoming trials, failing to report those matters to WMATA, and a prior conviction for sexual solicitation.
- WMATA policy required drivers to report lost/suspended licenses within 24 hours and pending litigation that could affect license status immediately; Rogers admitted failing to report some violations in writing during an April 29, 2013 meeting.
- Rogers grieved his termination; an arbitration board upheld WMATA’s discharge, finding persuasive evidence of terminable offenses and no mitigating or discriminatory factors.
- Rogers sued alleging (1) WMATA breached the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by wrongfully terminating him and (2) Local 689 (the union) breached its duty of fair representation during arbitration — a “hybrid” § 301/fair-representation action.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; Rogers did not file an opposition, and the court treated defendants’ factual statements as conceded but still required defendants to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether WMATA breached the CBA by terminating Rogers | Rogers contends termination violated the CBA (was improper) | WMATA argues termination was for legitimate, terminable policy violations (suspended license, failure to report, prior conviction) | Court held WMATA did not breach the CBA; termination was justified |
| Whether Local 689 breached its duty of fair representation in arbitration | Rogers alleges inadequate representation during arbitration | Local 689 argues arbitration process produced a valid adverse result and no unfair representation shown | Court did not reach the merits because WMATA’s lawful termination foreclosed the hybrid claim; summary judgment for defendants |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate despite Rogers’ failure to oppose | Rogers effectively failed to oppose the motions | Defendants relied on undisputed facts and legal arguments; court may treat facts as conceded but must still show entitlement to judgment | Court exercised discretion not to permit further response given counsel’s repeated litigation failures and granted summary judgment |
| Whether factual disputes precluded summary judgment | Rogers could have created disputes through discovery/response | Defendants presented uncontested record (investigation, admissions, arbitration decision) | Court found no genuine disputes of material fact and granted judgment to defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (treating unopposed factual statements as conceded while requiring movant to demonstrate entitlement to judgment)
- DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (defines hybrid breach-of-contract/breach-of-fair-representation action)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s summary judgment burden to show absence of genuine factual dispute)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (defines materiality and genuine dispute standards for summary judgment)
- Cephas v. MVM, Inc., 520 F.3d 480 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (hybrid action requires proof of both employer breach and union breach)