Rogers v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 387

Background

Consolidated rails-to-trails actions challenge Trails Act conversion of the Seaboard right-of-way from Sarasota to Venice, Florida and seek just compensation for claimed takings.
This opinion addresses 55 landowners linked to five conveyances—Palmer, Blackburn, Frazer, Knight, Phillips—and property with no identified written conveyance.
The STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment in 2004; the Trust and CSX/Seminole Gulf acted in reliance, with a quitclaim stating the STB retained jurisdiction for possible railroad reactivation.
Prior opinions resolved liability for several conveyances; the Palmer conveyance is claimed to have created a taking when the rail corridor was converted to a trail, while Frazer, Blackburn, and Phillips are argued to have transferred fee simple title to Seaboard, negating liability for those parcels.
The Knight conveyance contains a handwritten condition that the railroad be built within five years; the court held this did not alter the fee-simple nature of the grant because the condition was not a valid reverter in a defeasible fee.
Regarding unrepresented parcels obtained by possession or adverse possession, the record is insufficient to determine whether Seaboard acquired fee simple title via adverse possession or a prescriptive easement.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Palmer conveyance creates a taking?	Palmer grants conveyed a right-of-way; trail use unconstitutionally extinguishes reversionary interests.	Palmer language mirrors an easement with a reversionary clause; continued rail use or subsequent trail use does not revest in owners.	Palmer claims support partial summary judgment for plaintiffs.
Do Frazer, Blackburn, and Phillips conveyances transfer fee simple?	Language conveys all rights, title and interest, implying fee simple instead of easement.	Language reflects easement rights; lack of explicit fee language and use restrictions imply easement.	Frazer, Blackburn, Phillips conveyances transfer fee simple; no taking by these parcels.
Knight conveyance creates a defeasible fee or easement?	Handwritten clause suggests easement or defeasible fee dependent on railroad construction.	Clause does not alter fee simple; conveyance remains fee simple determinable with condition subsequent.	Knight conveys fee simple determinable; no taking for this parcel.
Seaboard acquired rights by possession or prescriptive easement for parcels obtained by possession?	Evidence shows open and notorious use; Florida law recognizes long use can create prescriptive interests.	Evidence insufficient to prove seven-year possession or twenty-year adversarial use; ambiguity remains.	Summary judgment inappropriate; fact issues remain regarding possession-derived title.
Overall takings analysis under Rails-to-Trails Act with Florida law controls?	Trails Act taking occurs when a new recreational easement is created over previously railroad-burdened land.	Nature of the underlying grant and whether a fee simple or easement existed governs liability; some parcels show no taking.	Liability determinations split by conveyance; Palmer upholds taking, Frazer/Blackburn/Phillips negate taking, Knight negates taking, possession-based issues unresolved.

Key Cases Cited

Preseault II, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (taking occurs when new recreational easement is imposed, creating a reversionary interest)
Preseault I, 494 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (federal taking framework for railbanking conversions)
Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (NITU precludes vesting of state law reversionary interests)
Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (taking analysis tied to railbanking and NITU effects)
Bird Bay Realty Corp. v. United States, 93 Fed.Cl. 609 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (deeds language and intent determine fee simple vs. easement under Florida law)
Rogers v. United States, 90 Fed.Cl. 418 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Honoré conveyance language indicates easement; fee interest not conveyed)