Rogers v. Jack's Supper Club
935 N.W.2d 754
Neb.2019Background
- Rogers suffered a work-related back injury in 2001 and designated Dr. Beyers as her Form 50 physician.
- After Dr. Beyers died and Rogers moved to Florida, she obtained treatment from Dr. Jonathan Daitch (pain management) and Dr. Mark Means (chiropractor) without employer agreement, court order, or a referral from the Form 50 physician.
- JSC (employer/insurer) reimbursed some treatment from Dr. Stonehocker (a colleague of Beyers) but refused to reimburse the Florida providers; Rogers moved the compensation court to compel payment.
- The Workers’ Compensation Court ordered JSC to reimburse certain Florida medical bills and stated Rogers could continue treatment with Drs. Daitch and Frey.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court held that § 48-120(2) and Rule 50 bar unilateral changes from the Form 50 physician absent employer agreement or court order, reversed the reimbursement ruling, and remanded because the trial court’s order failed to make the findings required by Rule 11 about any change in the Form 50 physician or ongoing treatment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether JSC must reimburse medical care obtained from Florida providers despite Rogers having designated a Form 50 physician in Nebraska | Rogers: plain statute should not bar reimbursement when employee moves or Form 50 physician dies; employer previously reimbursed some out-of-network care | JSC: § 48-120(2) and Rule 50 prohibit unilateral change; employer not liable for services obtained in disregard of that scheme | Held: Reversed — § 48-120(2) plainly precludes reimbursement where services were obtained outside Form 50/referral or without employer agreement or court order |
| Whether the Florida treatment was reasonable and necessary | Rogers: treatment (including long-term opioids) was related to work injury and necessary | JSC: medical reports showed complaints disproportionate to injury and recommended weaning from opioids; long-term opioids not supported | Held: Appellate court rejected reimbursement based on statutory noncompliance; trial court’s reasonableness findings as to past bills were undercut by statutory bar and the record required clearer findings for ongoing care |
| Whether JSC waived defense by voluntarily paying for treatment from Dr. Stonehocker or by not pleading failure-to-refer as an affirmative defense | Rogers: voluntary payments and failure to plead forfeited JSC’s right to invoke § 48-120(2) | JSC: voluntary payments are not admissions of liability; workers’ comp motions practice does not require responsive pleadings, so defense not waived | Held: Rejected plaintiff — voluntary payments do not admit liability and JSC did not waive its statutory defense |
| Whether the compensation court’s order complied with Rule 11 (required findings for meaningful appellate review) | Rogers: order allowed continued treatment and implied approval | JSC: order lacked necessary findings to show a lawful change of Form 50 physician or to explain ongoing treatment authority | Held: Reversed and remanded — order failed to state whether it was changing the Form 50 physician under § 48-120(6) or to clarify the scope/effect of any required review, so remand with directions to enter a Rule 11-compliant order was required |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. CMR Constr. & Roofing of Texas, 302 Neb. 618 (Neb. 2019) (standards for appellate review and modification of compensation court orders)
- Clark v. Alegent Health Neb., 285 Neb. 60 (Neb. 2013) (employee may unilaterally select a new physician when employer denies compensability for chain-of-referral treatment)
- Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 283 Neb. 868 (Neb. 2012) (when literal reading of a clause produces manifest absurdity, courts may apply rules of construction)
- McBee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 255 Neb. 903 (Neb. 1999) (voluntary workers’ compensation payments do not constitute admission of liability)
- Owen v. American Hydraulics, 254 Neb. 685 (Neb. 1998) (remand required where compensation court’s findings are insufficient for appellate review)
- Hale v. Standard Meat Co., 251 Neb. 37 (Neb. 1996) (same principle regarding inadequate findings and remand)
- State v. Garcia, 301 Neb. 912 (Neb. 2018) (statutory interpretation principles: start with plain language in context)
- State v. Wal, 302 Neb. 308 (Neb. 2019) (plain and ordinary meaning governs statutory interpretation)
- Stewart v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 294 Neb. 1010 (Neb. 2016) (courts must not read meanings into statutes that are not there)
- Allen v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 41 (Neb. 2009) (use current statutory text where text has remained the same or substantially similar)
- Mays v. Midnite Dreams, 300 Neb. 485 (Neb. 2018) (legislature, not courts, establishes public policy through statutes)
