710 F. App'x 57
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Roger Scott Wilson, a former DuPont research associate, alleged DuPont retaliated against him (hostile work environment, forced leave, mental-health testing, negative reviews, pay/work changes) after he reported management’s failure to disclose a carcinogenic gas release; he resigned in 2012.
- Wilson sued under CPSIA whistleblower provision (15 U.S.C. § 2087(a)) and FLSA amendment/ACA-created provision (29 U.S.C. § 218c) claiming unlawful retaliation.
- DuPont moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing Wilson failed to exhaust administrative remedies before suing in federal court as required by the statutes.
- The District Court agreed, dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and denied Wilson’s summary judgment motion as moot.
- Wilson conceded he never filed an administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor/OSHA; he argued instead that an EEOC charge filed later amounted to exhaustion or tolling, but that charge did not allege the whistleblower retaliation claimed in his federal complaint.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding Wilson failed to exhaust the required administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statutory pre-suit administrative exhaustion required by CPSIA and §218c bars Wilson’s suit | Wilson contended his EEOC filing and related filings equitably tolled or satisfied exhaustion | DuPont argued Wilson never filed the required complaint with the Secretary of Labor/OSHA and thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies | Court held exhaustion is mandatory; Wilson did not file with Secretary/OSHA and EEOC charge did not raise whistleblower claims, so dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff must exhaust required administrative remedies before judicial relief)
- FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232 (U.S. 1980) (courts should not interfere with agency processes; exhaustion promotes efficiency and agency expertise)
- Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 279 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2002) (standard of review: de novo for exhaustion questions; abuse of discretion for denial of exceptions)
- Higgs v. Attorney General, 655 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2011) (courts liberally construe pro se filings)
