Roger Sanders v. Allison Engine Company, Inc.
703 F.3d 930
6th Cir.2012Background
- This FCA qui tam case stems from relators Sanders and Thacker alleging contractor fraud in Navy generator sets; prior panel held no presentment requirement for liability under §3729(a)(2)/(3).
- The Supreme Court reversed in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, holding presentment to the government is required for §3729(a)(2) liability.
- FERA of 2009 amended the FCA to remove presentment and added retroactivity, stating amendments apply to pending claims as of June 7, 2008.
- District court granted preclusive retroactivity for §3729(a)(1)(B); the order was certified for interlocutory appeal to resolve retroactivity scope.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding §4(f)(1) refers to claims pending on June 7, 2008, so retroactive application to pending cases is appropriate, and remanded for proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What is the scope of retroactivity under §4(f)(1)? | Sanders argues §4(f)(1) retroactively applies to pending FCA claims. | Allison Engine argues §4(f)(1) should apply only to claims for payment, not to cases. | §4(f)(1) refers to a civil action/case; retroactive unless barred by other limits. |
| Does ‘claim’ in §4(f)(1) mean a demand for payment or a civil action? | Sanders asserts ‘claim’ means civil action in context. | Allison Engine argues ‘claim’ means a request for payment under the FCA definitions. | Court adopts reading that ‘claim’ means a civil action/case for retroactivity purposes. |
| Does retroactive application violate Ex Post Facto or Due Process? | Sanders contends retroactivity is civil, not punishment; thus no Ex Post Facto issue. | Defense argues retroactivity could be punitive and violate Ex Post Facto or Due Process. | Retroactive application does not violate Ex Post Facto or Due Process after Mendoza-Martinez analysis. |
| Is the FCA punitive in purpose or effect when applied retroactively? | Sanders contends the statute is civil/remedial, not punitive. | Defense argues treble damages and punitive potential may render it punitive. | Overall Mendoza-Martinez factors favor civil purpose; retroactivity upheld. |
Key Cases Cited
- Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2008) (establishes presentment requirement for liability under §3729(a)(2))
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (guide for civil vs. criminal distinction and due process in retroactivity)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (U.S. 1963) (factors for punitive vs civil character of sanctions)
- Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (U.S. 2000) (treble damages/punitive considerations in FCA context)
- Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2003) (treble damages may have compensatory aspects; civil/remedial framing)
- United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (U.S. 1976) (historical remedial nature of civil penalties)