Roger Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18206
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- In July 2012, Roger Nicklaw sold property and used the proceeds to satisfy a CitiMortgage mortgage. New York law required recording a certificate of discharge within 30 days; monetary penalties increased at 60 and 90 days.
- CitiMortgage did not record the satisfaction until October 17, 2012 (over 90 days after satisfaction).
- Nicklaw filed a putative class action in 2013; CitiMortgage made a Rule 68 offer of judgment providing the relief sought; the district court dismissed that suit as moot and Nicklaw did not appeal.
- In 2014 Nicklaw filed a second suit alleging the same statutory violation (late recording); the complaint did not allege he or anyone knew of the late recording or that he suffered any concrete harm.
- The district court dismissed the second complaint; on appeal the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Nicklaw had Article III standing and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because he alleged no concrete injury, causation, or redressability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nicklaw has Article III standing to sue for a statutory late recording | NY law creates a substantive right to timely recording; statutory violation alone gives standing | No concrete injury, risk of harm, or redressable injury alleged; suit mootable/remedied | No standing: dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (plaintiff alleged only a late recording and no harm or risk of harm) |
| Whether historical/common-law remedies supply concreteness for the statutory claim | Timely recording right has roots in common-law remedies (quiet title, satisfaction remedies) | Historical remedies address risks while title cloud exists, not remedied violations after the fact | Historical analogues do not show a concrete injury here where the cloud was removed and no harm alleged |
| Whether a statutory violation alone (without harm) satisfies Spokeo concreteness test | Statutory right should be sufficient; Congress intended substantive protection | Spokeo requires concrete injury or material risk of harm beyond statutory violation alone | Statutory violation alone is insufficient under Spokeo absent concrete harm or risk |
| Whether prior Rule 68 offer/mootness preclusion needed resolution | (Not reached by court on standing) | (Not reached) | Court did not reach preclusion because lack of Article III jurisdiction dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (concreteness requirement for statutory injuries)
- Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (statutory right to information can be concrete)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (statutory informational injury can be concrete)
- United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (standing limits and prudential considerations)
- Culverhouse v. Paulson & Co. Inc., 813 F.3d 991 (11th Cir.) (standard of review for dismissal)