Roger Murray v. Dora Schriro, 882 F.3d 778

Background

In May 1991 two elderly victims were found execution-style murdered at their rural Arizona store; the Murray brothers (Roger and Robert) were arrested with weapons, stolen property, and physical evidence linking them to the scene.
A jury convicted both brothers of first-degree murder and Roger of armed robbery; the trial court found three statutory aggravators (pecuniary gain, especially heinous/cruel/depraved, multiple homicides) and imposed death sentences.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed convictions and sentences on direct appeal after addressing numerous trial and sentencing claims (jury selection, evidentiary rulings, instructions, mitigation, sentencing procedures).
Roger pursued state post-conviction relief (Rule 32), raising ineffective-assistance claims (including counsel sleeping, failure to secure experts/witnesses) and other claims; most were denied and some were summarily rejected.
Roger filed a federal habeas petition under AEDPA raising many of the same claims; the district court denied relief and declined a COA on most claims, but the Ninth Circuit granted COA on ten specified claims and affirmed denial of habeas relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Murray)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1. Change of venue due to pretrial publicity	Publicity was pervasive and inflammatory; trial atmosphere was "utterly corrupted."	Coverage was largely factual, voir dire probed bias, admonitions given; no presumed or actual prejudice.	Denied — state court and AEDPA review reasonable; publicity did not meet rare presumed-prejudice standard.
2. Fair cross-section of jury venire	Jury list process excluded young, rural, poor, and (in federal claim) Christians, denying fair cross-section/equal protection.	Selection used neutral lists/process; claim about Christians was not exhausted and no systematic exclusion shown.	Denied — exhaustion/default for new Christian theory; merits fail for lack of systematic exclusion.
3. Batson challenge to strikes of Hispanic jurors	Prosecution used peremptories to remove the only Hispanic venirepersons.	Prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons; trial court credited them.	Denied — race-neutral explanations upheld on AEDPA review.
4. Denial of request to re-inspect crime scene	Re-inspection would produce material, exculpatory evidence for defense investigation.	Scene was cleaned; prior inspection by defense counsel and investigators; evidence not plausibly material.	Denied — Valenzuela-Bernal principles applied reasonably; no material, favorable evidence shown.
5. Omission of voluntary intoxication instruction	Evidence of drinking warranted voluntary intoxication instruction that could negate specific intent.	Record lacked credible evidence that intoxication impaired ability to form intent; no statutory/constitutional entitlement absent evidentiary support.	Denied — instruction not supported by evidence; no due process violation.
6. Denial of second-degree (lesser-included) murder instruction	Jury should have been instructed on second-degree murder/lesser offense; Enmund/Tison concerns about culpability.	Evidence overwhelmingly showed deliberation/premeditation; lesser instruction would be unsupported.	Denied — no reasonable basis for jury to find only second-degree murder; Enmund/Tison not implicated.
7. Failure to consider mitigation (causal-nexus argument)	Arizona courts required improper causal nexus between background/mitigation and the crime, violating Eddings/Penry/Smith.	Sentencer considered all mitigation and permissibly weighed causal relevance; no Eddings error or harmless if any.	Denied — state court weighed mitigation; any causal-nexus ambiguity was not an unreasonable application and would be harmless.
8. Motion to replace counsel for irreconcilable conflict	Complete breakdown in attorney-client relationship warranted new counsel.	Dispute concerned strategy, not total breakdown; reappointment and advisory counsel addressed issues.	Denied — no irreconcilable conflict; Martinez gateway not satisfied.
9. IAC: trial counsel asleep during trial	Counsel dozed through substantial portions of trial, depriving Murray of assistance (per Javor/Cronic).	Record/trial transcript shows counsel was engaged; conflicting testimony; PCR court credited non-sleep testimony.	Denied — state factfinding reasonable; no Strickland deficiency and AEDPA deference applies.
10. IAC: failure to produce exculpatory witness (John Anthony)	Counsel failed to locate/call a key witness who saw other men and a different car, depriving defense.	Investigator attempted to locate witness who was unavailable; even if admissible, testimony would not overcome overwhelming inculpatory evidence.	Denied — counsel not deficient (reasonable efforts), and no prejudice under Strickland/AEDPA.

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes)
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (voir dire and actual juror bias standard)
Valenzuela-Bernal v. United States, 458 U.S. 858 (due process requires evidence sought be material and favorable)
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (preservation of potentially exculpatory evidence principles)
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (limits on death penalty when defendant neither killed nor intended killing)
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (death penalty may apply for major participant with reckless indifference)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance of counsel standard)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (presumed prejudice and pretrial publicity principles)
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (lesser-included offense instruction principles)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (limits on federal habeas review of state-law evidentiary/sentencing claims)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference standard for state-court decisions)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limitation of federal evidentiary hearings; review limited to state-court record)