264 A.3d 1237
Me.2021Background
- Roger DesGrosseilliers worked as a sheet metal worker with asbestos exposure through 1994; he underwent lung-cancer surgery on November 2, 2015 and was later diagnosed with asbestosis.
- In March 2016 he filed five consolidated Occupational Disease petitions covering various employers/periods; the ALJ found his last injurious exposure occurred in 1994 while working for Auburn Sheet Metal, then insured by MEMIC. Auburn Sheet Metal has since ceased to exist.
- The ALJ treated November 2, 2015 as the date of injury but found claimant became aware the claim was compensable on February 26, 2016. Notice to the former employer’s insurer was received March 28, 2016 (31 days after awareness); the ALJ ruled notice was timely (30th day fell on Sunday and claimant acted under a mistake of fact).
- The parties entered a consent decree contingent on appellate resolution of the notice issue; the Appellate Division affirmed on the ground that §301 does not require notice to an insurer when the employer no longer exists.
- MEMIC appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court asking the Court to hold that §301 (in light of §102(12)) requires notice to an insurer when the employer is defunct. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an employee must give statutory §301 notice of an occupational disease to the employer’s insurer when the employer no longer exists | DesGrosseilliers: §301 requires notice to the employer (who is nonexistent) but does not impose a duty to notify the insurer; no statutory text compels insurer notice | MEMIC: §102(12) defines “employer” to include an insurer when the employer is insured, so §301 should be read to permit/require notice to the insurer (especially when employer no longer exists) | Court: §301 does not impose a duty to notify the insurer when the employer is no longer in existence; the court will not graft that requirement onto the statute and defers to the Appellate Division’s interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. City of Lewiston, 168 A.3d 762 (Me. 2017) (standard of review for Appellate Division workers’ compensation decisions)
- Johnson v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 106 A.3d 401 (Me. 2014) (deference to Appellate Division unless statute plainly compels different result)
- Urrutia v. Interstate Brands Int’l, 179 A.3d 312 (Me. 2018) (workers’ compensation is a uniquely statutory scheme; interpret statutes harmoniously)
- Daigle v. Daigle, 505 A.2d 778 (Me. 1986) (purpose of notice requirement—to permit prompt medical care, investigation, and prevention)
- Dunton v. E. Fine Paper Co., 423 A.2d 512 (Me. 1980) (notice purpose and policy)
- Clark v. DeCoster Egg Farms, 421 A.2d 939 (Me. 1980) (notice purpose and policy)
- HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725 (Me. 2011) (legislature’s known drafting choices inform statutory interpretation)
- Ryerson v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 495 A.2d 808 (Me. 1985) (policy changes to workers’ compensation must come from the Legislature)
- Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213 (Me. 1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act is legislative creation; courts should avoid creating new statutory obligations)